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Introduction: Civil Society in Globalizing Cities of the South 
By Simon Raiser and Krister Volkmann 
The 21st century often is presented as the „urban century“, during which the majority of the 
world’s population will be living in cities for the first time in history. While urbanization already 
reached very high levels in Europe and the Americas early after World War II, this process 
continues at tremendous speed in large parts of Asia and Africa. On average, the population 
of urban regions in the developing world is growing five times faster than the population of 
urban areas in the North. In 2030 an estimated 79% of the world’s urban population will live 
in the so-called developing countries.1 
The enormous growth of urban areas has created many serious problems and poses 
great challenges for urban governance. The mega-cities and globalizing city regions in the 
South are faced with these challenges with growing intensity,2 considering that the urbaniza-
tion process was initiated only within the past few decades. In the countries of the North, the 
same process took about a century, creating great historical ruptures there as well. The 
growing urban population needs access to jobs and infrastructure (housing, water and 
sanitation, electricity, roads and public transportation, waste collection, educational and 
health services, cultural facilities). At the same time, the dense concentration of so many 
people puts the natural environment under extreme pressure. Within the given financial and 
institutional restrictions, these problems remain to a large part unresolved for at least a great 
part of the inhabitants in the big Southern cities.  
Since national governments in the past have failed to ameliorate the situation, one 
answer has been to partly decentralize tasks. Local governments are seen to be closer to the 
problems and better prepared to provide necessary infrastructure and services.3 Not always, 
however, have the local authorities been equipped with accompanying financial resources 
and/or competences. Under the neoliberal paradigm a further answer has been the deregula-
tion and opening-up of national economies. This offers new opportunities to attract foreign 
capital and entrepreneurs, who create new jobs, but it also makes local actors more vulner-
able to volatile international financial markets and profit-oriented multi-national corporations. 
Together, these trends have transformed the setting for city government. Different levels of 
government are involved, as well as an increasing number of non-state actors: private com-
panies, non-governmental and community-based organizations (NGO/ CBO), religious con-
gregations, and engaged citizens. Within political science, the term “urban governance” has 
been introduced4 to describe this new mode of interdependent steering of the city polity. This 
series of working papers looks at a specific aspect of urban governance: the role of civil so-
ciety in globalizing city regions in the developing world.  
Civil society is not a clearly defined concept. Different notions exist about its essence, 
                                                
1 McCarney/Stren 2003, p. 2. 
2 Gugler 2004. 
3 Whitfield 2001. 
4 McCarney, Halfani, and Rodríguez 1995. On “governance” in general, see: Rhodes 1996; Jessop 1998; Pi-
erre/Peters 2000; Rosenau/Czempiel 2000. 
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boundaries, and functions. The observation and recognition of a civic sphere outside of state 
rule gradually emerged with the contract theories of the Enlightenment era, but the nature of 
this civic sphere was characterized very differently by philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau. Alexis de Tocqueville impressively described the contribution of civic associations 
to American democracy in the first half of the 19th century. Later in the century, Karl Marx 
analyzed civil society in the context of class struggle as part of bourgeois society. Today, 
theories on civil society remain a contested terrain. Different traditions are reflected and fur-
ther developed in modern approaches represented by Edward Shils, Charles Taylor, Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Michael Walzer, Hannah Ahrendt, and others, while a radical notion of civil soci-
ety continues in the Gramscian legacy to view it as an agent to build up counterhegemonic 
power. Accordingly, the approaches by the authors in this working paper differ in their as-
sessment of the role of civil society for development. They all, however, add refreshing views 
and experiences to a hitherto rather euro-centric debate. 
The contributions in this working paper present issue-related research findings of a 
comprehensive, interdisciplinary research project “Global city regions as changing sites of 
governance”5 directed by professor Klaus Segbers, Free University Berlin. They are written 
by local experts in the four project city regions: Sudha Mohan (Mumbai/Bombay), Pedro 
Jacobi (São Paulo), Fan Lizhu (Shanghai) and Patrick Bond (Johannesburg). 
 
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
The UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements 2001 describes an amazing phe-
nomenon. In Mumbai, slum dwellers have started to count themselves. This means literally 
that they keep track how many people – and also who – live in the neighborhood. It is an 
impressive example of how the slum dwellers have organized themselves in order to keep 
population statistics of the informal settlement – a task that is originally one of the most genu-
ine domains of the state (as indicated by the very word “stat(e)-istics”6). The people has 
taken over this state responsibility for very concrete reasons. Only when their own number is 
known, can they make themselves and their grievances and demands recognized. It is the 
sheer necessity of make themselves visible that has motivated them to conduct their own 
census. 
This is probably an extreme example of how civil society shows tries to compensate 
for a lack of state action. In many cities in the developing world, however, a wide variety of 
non-governmental and/or community-based organizations step in where state activity is in-
adequate or even completely missing. Other organizations and social movements form net-
works to make demands to officials or resist government and/or business action deemed to 
threaten a community. In her contribution Sudha Mohan presents three types of strategies 
practiced by civil society organizations: 1) persuasive strategies, aiming to bring certain is-
                                                
5 For information on this research project, see http://www.city-regions.de. Part of the findings will be published 
with Ashgate Publications under the title “Public Problems – Private Solutions? New Trends from Globalizing 
Cities in the South”. A second book publication is currently under negotiation. 
6 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) 2001: pp. 171-175. 
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sues to the attention of the authorities; 2) collaborative strategies, including cooperation with 
authorities; and 3) confrontational strategies that organize protest action against the authori-
ties. They all belong to the realm of civil society, as long as they are conducted without vio-
lence, though they may well include acts of old and new forms of civil disobedience7. 
 
EXPERIENCES FROM GLOBALIZING CITIES IN THE SOUTH  
In her analysis of civil society in Mumbai/Bombay, Sudha Mohan identifies the decline of in-
stitutional politics, which in the past failed to respond to the needs of the poor majority, as a 
key factor explaining the rise of civil society organizations in the 1990s. The other major fac-
tor identified by her is the new stage of globalization, which is a dichotomous process. It 
causes new problems for society, but it also has enabled new alliances between local actors. 
An interdependent development of “glocalization” is the result. Consequently the range of 
civil society organizations has changed considerably in the last two decades. Older organiza-
tions based on philanthropic, charity, and social welfare ideals have been complemented or 
replaced by new social movements formed around issues such as ecology, human rights, 
women, and dalit (casteless people). The contribution of this sector towards poverty allevia-
tion and development is increasingly being recognized in the recent official five-year plans 
(seventh and eighth, 1985-1990 and 1991-1996 respectively). Mohan briefly presents several 
cases of innovative civil society action, such as a business-sponsored educational initiative 
on the one end of the spectrum and a women’s grassroots organization that assists micro-
entrepreneurs on the other. Finally, she cautions that civil society action does not make gov-
ernment action obsolete and that there are also traps in over-reliance on NGOs. NGOs 
sometimes build up considerable bureaucracy and may in the worst case loose close contact 
to the people concerned. 
A number of parallel trends can be found in Pedro Jacobi’s analysis of civil society in 
São Paulo. Older movements that played an important role in opposing the military regime 
are partly loosing momentum. New organizations have come into being, focusing on unem-
ployment, violence, women’s issues, and the inclusion of ethnic groups and minorities. 
Jacobi argues that this may be seen as a strengthening of democracy, where the activity of 
social movements is gradually cast into institutional forms of participation, such as the prac-
tice of Participatory Budgeting. Still, the movements vary greatly according to the degree of 
institutionalization, starting with the Worker’s Party (PT), which formed the national and sev-
eral regional governments, to grassroots communities of the Catholic church (Communi-
dades Eclesiais de Base), and the radical movement of landless workers (Movimento dos 
Sem Terra, MST). The strategies range from collaborative to confrontational. 
Similar to Mumbai/Bombay, Jacobi observes an increase in cooperative action. Civil-
society organizations are formed to step in when state policies fail to address burning issues, 
but this action takes place in cooperation with the authorities. The practice in many Brazilian 
cities of Participatory Budgeting (a process whereby ordinary citizens make decisions on 
                                                
7 Kleger 1993. 
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local investment priorities) is highly innovative and probably the most prominent example of 
government recognition of civil society’s contribution to urban development. The particular 
cases presented by Jacobi portray projects concerned with so-called “social entrepreneur-
ship”, cooperative breeders and micro-credit, which also aim to reduce violence in low-
income neighborhoods. As such, they attempt to build a civil society without violence, or at 
least with a lesser degree thereof. The other category of initiatives focusses on “digital inclu-
sion”, which seeks to employ modern technology to open new opportunities for marginalized 
people. Like Mohan, Jacobi describes a dual process induced by globalization, producing 
great social asymmetries but also allowing for “important innovations to make democracy 
work”. 
The contribution on Shanghai by Fan Lizhu shows that civil society is an increasingly 
relevant topic in China, too. Official mottos such as “Small government, big society” underline 
this trend, as do concrete policies of “community construction”. This is a planned attempt to 
create new structures in accordance with the market economy. It is intended to combine tra-
ditional Chinese forms of societal organization with Western models as far as they are con-
sidered beneficial under the present political system. The comparison with Mumbai and In-
dia, however, reveals the strong state domination of society still in place in China. According 
to Fan Lizhu, “the government is always in the core position in cooperative relationships and 
alliance relationships [...] Government did not become ‘smaller and smaller’, but stronger and 
stronger”. The interesting case study of Meiyuan community bears evidence of how the con-
tact with Western culture slowly is influencing traditional values and giving rise to hidden con-
flicts. 
The fourth contribution, by Patrick Bond on Johannesburg, starts from a somewhat 
different position. Building on the Gramscian notion of civil society that composes a counter-
hegemony, Bond focusses on urban social movements that are “protest-oriented and uto-
pian”, rather than on implementation-oriented NGOs or mutual aid groupings. With respect to 
the former, he points out that “Johannesburg is notable in many respects, not least because 
it has [...] spawned amongst the most vigorous urban social movements anywhere on earth”. 
According to Bond, this is a specific manifestation of how the “urban” and the “global” come 
together in this South-African metropolis through civil society challenges to municipal, na-
tional, and even global-scale political processes. In his analysis he describes the rise, fall, 
and subsequent revival of Johannesburg’s civic associations and popular movements in re-
sponse to a policy shift by the ANC-led governments at the national and local levels. This 
return of civic protest is exemplified by the struggles for decommodifying water and electricity 
and civil society marches on Sandton (the site of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development).  
Patrick Bond’s contribution reminds us of the limitations of cooperative strategies and 
the ambiguities and difficult choices with which civil society has to deal. It is important to ob-
serve that although development can hardly succeed without civil society, civil society actors 
cannot solve problems alone either. As Sudha Mohan pointed out, “these organizations can 
never be a substitute for the state [...]”. The state is still needed and can not be allowed to 
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escape its responsibilities. Civil society can complement state activity. On the other hand, 
civil society, as understood by Bond, helps to articulate political dissent and as such plays a 
crucial role in making state authorities more transparent and responsive to the citizens’ 
needs and concepts.  
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1. Political Transformation and Capacity Building: Role and 
Relevance of Civil Society in Mumbai  
By Sudha Mohan 
Civil society8 gained public attention in the 1980s as an attempt to establish civility in society. 
It was seen as the opposite of despotism, a ‘space’ in which groups can exist to ensure bet-
ter and more tolerable conditions of existence. However, civil society is complicated, in being 
both a ‘social value and a set of social institutions’.9 Civil society thus is used both as a nor-
mative concept and as an empirical description. As a normative concept, it prescribes the 
conditions for effective governance. As a descriptive concept, it identifies certain viable social 
activities, civic dispositions, and non-state institutions that are linked to development. 
This paper critically appraises the role and relevance of civil society with reference to 
the current disaffection with the state and its institutions. It examines the emergence of a new 
form of ‘state-society synergy’ when horizontal civil society organizations (CSOs) interact 
with the conventional vertical structures of the political system. The paper also discusses the 
reallocation of roles and responsibilities between the state and civil society actors in the 
quest for the construction of a new urban development coalition in the era of liberalization 
and globalization. However, it wishes to neither celebrate urban development coalition revival 
nor skeptically undermine its function, but it purports objectively to perceive the salience of 
civil society organizations in Mumbai.  
From Hobbes to Gramsci, there have been many variants on the notion of civil soci-
ety. But the most important institutional component of civil society comprises voluntary 
groups of different hues and kinds, including community groups, co-operatives, unions, as-
sociations, self-help groups, foundations, social service agencies etc. There is no such thing 
as ‘the’ civil society. There are hence Hobbesian and Hegelian, Marxian and Gramscian con-
ceptions of civil society. They share one thing in common - they all refer to the sphere of so-
cial life, which falls outside the state, though they do not see it as necessarily free from state 
interference. To put it simply, civil society here is seen as groups and individuals that are at 
the interface between the state and the rest of the social order. 
 
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN MUMBAI THE ‘URBS PRIMA’ OF INDIA 
Mumbai is the capital of the state of Maharashtra and the financial and commercial capital of 
India. Most importantly, Mumbai connotes more than just the land area and the material 
wealth that it houses on it. Mumbai is a concept, an idea, a dream cherished by millions who 
look up to it for being liberated from their poverty and inhuman social conditions. Cities have 
become ‘sites’ for several contestations, and Mumbai is no exception. However, cities have 
their contradictory sides. Mumbai too is a city of contrasts. This city, which has global preten-
                                                
8 Unstructured interviews were carried out with bureaucrats, political leaders, NGO activists and members of 
community for the purpose of this study. 
9 Hall 1995. 
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sions, houses more than half of its people in slums. Though it is poised on the path of global-
ization, it is faced with the growing problem of urban degeneration.  
This metropolitan city therefore, encompasses several facets of life. It is, on the one 
hand, an epitome of modernity and culture itself. It symbolizes the best that human spirit and 
enterprise has wrought. On the other hand, it also represents the sordid side of human life - 
the dehumanizing and debilitating aspects that thwart human spirit. This dualism has several 
causes. A number of factors such as poverty, lack of employment in the villages, industrial 
and technological advancements that sometimes render human labor superfluous, and other 
socio-cultural factors have contributed to urban blight. However, it is also important to point 
out that this city’s pulsating spirit and its never-say-die attitude have led to many dynamic 
changes over the last several decades. The current process is one of change, churning, and 
transformation taking place in a mega-city that epitomizes the worst and the best of human 
existence.  
The twin process of de-industrialization and informalization preceded the liberalization 
initiated in the 1990s. They were set into motion in the late 1970s. Further policies only ac-
centuated the problem, with liberalization leading to the state’s withdrawal from social-sector 
funding and pressure put on communities to raise and manage resources themselves. Re-
duction in state control did not bring about market economy, as the markets became subser-
vient to global markets under globalization. Thus, coupled with a general disenchantment 
with political institutions, large sections of the urban poor were marginalized in the new dis-
pensation. This was mainly because the formal institutional structures were losing credibility. 
Political parties increasingly became electoral machines, communalizing politics for electoral 
gains. Trade unions did not effectively incorporate the informal sectors of the economy. The 
decline of institutional politics combined with the exclusion of people at best or manipulation 
at worst, pushed these sections further away from mainstream politics, resulting in the 
growth of movements, organizations, and associations that sought to address issues inde-
pendently.  
Globalization - the other widespread process to have had a tremendous impact in al-
most all countries - was beginning to be felt in India, and more specifically in the mega-city of 
Mumbai. The macro-effect of this phenomenon was felt and subsequently examined and 
interpreted. Debates equated globalization with the general, the necessary, and the abstract. 
However, insufficient attention has been paid to what it does at the specific, concrete ‘city’ 
level. Many scholars subscribe to the view that there is a dichotomy developing whereby 
globalization and localization occur simultaneously. This trend is expressed in terms of fine 
polarized oppositions, emphasizing the uneven and dialectical nature of the process. Locali-
ties or City Regions have become an important focus for social, political, and cultural mobili-
zation against perceived and present global threats. There is need to therefore articulate 
both the local and the global as two interdependent elements in a universal process. Terms 
like "glocalization" are increasingly used to illustrate the dialectical interrelation.10  
                                                
10 See e.g. Mittleman 1997; Robertson 1992, and Teune 1995.  
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Thus, when globalization is modified by its contact with the local, what actually seems 
to emerge is not what is usually believed to occur, homogenization, but an interesting fusion. 
It is evident from this fusion that organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, 
shape the city environment, transforming political and social life. Cities thus are not helpless 
pawns of international capital, but have the capability to mediate and direct their own destiny 
by exploiting their comparative advantages. They have the capacity to ‘mould’ as well as 
‘mirror’ global processes, if their energies and strengths can be put to positive use and ad-
vantage. The mega-city of Mumbai has been trying to do precisely this! 
 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND URBAN GOVERNANCE  
Yet another important challenge came about with the emergence of new social movements - 
ecology, human rights, women’s rights, and dalit11 -, which began addressing collective con-
cerns in new ways. A wide variety of social movements, raising issues relating to citizenship, 
legitimacy of state institutions, ability of the state to implement policies, participation of the 
common people in state institutions, animated the civil society sphere in a very significant 
manner in Mumbai.  
It is important to emphasize that the civil society organizations (henceforth: CSOs) 
that emerged in Mumbai did not represent a close-knit community but comprised a broad 
spectrum of diverse groups with varied activities. Some CSOs have been taking up the 
cause of the vulnerable sections in urban areas, sometimes independently, by providing al-
ternatives to the formal development model. However, their role assumes importance when 
combined with the efforts of state actors. They often collaborate with the formal governmen-
tal structures, making the delivery system more workable and viable. Their modus operandi 
involves three strategies:  
• Persuasive strategies - bringing issues to the attention of authorities through sur-
veys, the collection and presentation of evidence, and petitions. 
• Collaborative strategies - open interaction with authorities through lobbying of lo-
cal governmental offices and other decision-making bodies; and 
• Confrontational strategies - encounters with the government through rallies and 
marches.12  
Together, these strategies constitute a repertoire of action. The kind of action that a group 
undertakes may vary over time. A group may move from persuasive to confrontational, if the 
government does not respond to its demands. But it could also graduate to co-operative and 
collaborative strategies if it perceives that the state apparatus provides a congenial atmos-
phere for such collaborative endeavors.  
                                                
11 The term “Dalit” (meaning depressed classes) was apparently used in 1930 as the Devanagiri translation of 
‘depressed classes’, a term used by the British. Currently it has a broad definition, encompassing all those subal-
tern communities that have been discriminated for centuries. 
12 For Strategies adopted by the Action Group see Short 1996, p.270. 
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CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING  
The 1980s saw civil society organizations, most notably non-governmental organizations 
(henceforth NGOs), gaining ground. They achieved acceptance and credibility among both 
their constituencies as well as the government. These groups gained formal recognition in 
the Seventh Five-year Plan from 1985-90. Interestingly there was also a shift in thinking and 
in the action programs of many funding agencies. This led to an increase in the number of 
NGOs and funding organizations.  
It could be inferred from the processes at work then and from developments thereafter 
that civil society movements sought, first and foremost, non-state solutions to political ques-
tions, in other words, workable solutions at the local level. Second, the negative repercus-
sions of centralization consistently led to the decay of other institutions. This over-
centralization over the past three decades led to relative isolation of the political order from 
the social structures, what is usually referred to as the ‘crisis of political institutions in India.13 
Institutional decline thus was coupled with an unwillingness to decentralize political 
and administrative powers until almost the 1990s. Only in 1992 did the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment make local governments effective units of administration, at least for-
mally/constitutionally. Unwillingness on the part of the government of India at one level and 
state governments at another made decentralization merely a laudable goal. This led to the 
rise of alliances of various kinds forged between different sectors and actors to counter the 
problems confronting society and polity. 
The government later emphasized the need to formally incorporate civil society in pol-
icy implementation. This emphasis came in Five-Year plans (e.g. 1991-96) and could be 
seen as government’s response to the criticism that while it does not err in policy-making, it 
fails in implementation. Such official and institutional recognition given to the voluntary sector 
has been responsible for the further growth of this sector.  
 
RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
 
From Philanthropy to Development 
The most prevalent ideas in the past in both India and Mumbai were philanthropy, charity, 
and social welfare. This became less relevant in the post-colonial period. The resultant politi-
cal scenario, dominated by the welfare state, did not provide welfare benefits to a large num-
ber of people. It marginalized large numbers of people. This inspired the creation of several 
non-profit, non-governmental or non-party organizations, which specifically catered to prob-
lems relating to, e.g., housing, health care, and slum-rehabilitation. However, most of these 
groups were basically ‘protesting’ against the injustices in social life. Due to the lack of sus-
                                                
13 Sudipto 1984. 
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tainability, collective mobilization, and an emphasis on ideology, these groups are best de-
scribed as ‘protest groups.’14 
 
Decline of Institutional Politics 
Civil society gained prominence as a result of the decline of institutional politics. Processes 
of institutional exclusion and manipulation resulted in the alienation of civil society from 
mainstream politics.  
 
Failure of Plans 
The state allocated ever less to urban development. Many existing and laudable plans for 
state-sponsored urban development, intended to benefit the poor and disadvantaged, were 
not successful. This led to the realization that ‘government failure is a much more important 
problem than market failure’.15    
 
Reduction in Government Spending on Urban Development 
The reduction in the government budgets and ensuing reduction in government expenditures 
arose both from macro-economic problems and the failure of existing policies to cope with 
the needs of cities and their residents. Voluntary organizations stepped in to try to formulate 
and implement government policy. It became clear that the government was unable to tackle 
development on its own. Even the First Five-Year Plan document carried a brief plea for vol-
untary organizations to become part of the implementation mechanism. Yet only in the Sev-
enth (1985-90) and Eighth Plans (1991-96) was there a clear and substantial allocation of 
Rs. 200 and 750 crore16 to such groups. This was a steep increase from a meager 4 crore in 
the First Plan.17  
 
FORGING NEW ALLIANCES 
New alliances therefore came to be forged between the state and civil society. The state and 
civil society came together on certain issues (e.g., to protect the consumers). Civil society 
saw itself sometimes being caught between the state on the one hand and the ‘market’ on 
the other, fighting both simultaneously. Market and civil society started confronting the state 
when the state failed on the human rights front, and the state and the market came together 
to ‘punish’ some sections of civil society when it tended to become fundamentalist. The view 
that civil society is necessarily and always anti-state is, therefore, at variance with facts, as 
would be pointed out in this study. Civil society could be anti-state, pro-state, or neutral to the 
state. Thus, channels of political openness and popular influence were seen to be growing 
with the entrance of a large number of interests, opinions and groups in the city of Mumbai. 
                                                
14 Rao 1978. 
15 Virmani 2002. 
16  Editors’ remark: The word “crore” is commonly used in India to denote the number of 10 million. 
17 Dinesh 1985, p.259. 
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Civil Society began to ‘fill’ in for government where political controversy, rooted in demo-
graphic diversity, made it difficult for government to respond to collective needs.  
It soon became apparent that in real situations the state did not occupy a moral high 
ground nor that the state-civil society relationship was necessarily a contentious one. This 
preoccupation with the state had, for a very long period, “abstracted the state from its zone of 
engagement, i.e., civil society”.18 
Thus, three important developments contribute to a pragmatic interface between the 
state and civil society interface in Mumbai: 1) reworking within the state, 2) redefining the role 
of the state, and 3) moving from duality to commonalty between the state and civil society. 
Though civil society organizations can never be a substitute for the state, they can pressure 
the state to live up to their demands.  
 
EXISTING FORMS OF SELF-ORGANIZATIONS IN MUMBAI: ROLE AND FUNCTIONS 
The NGO sector is diverse and heterogeneous in the state of Maharashtra. The state regis-
tered about 427,164 organizations, including 181,181 charitable societies and 245,983 public 
trusts. In Mumbai alone there are 66,318 registered societies and 43,926 public charitable 
trusts. Maharashtra registers about 2,422 new charitable organizations per month, while the 
greater Mumbai region alone registers 216 charitable societies per month.19 It is important to 
note here that the NGOs do not represent a well-knit community, but comprise a broad spec-
trum of diverse groups with varied activities and ideologies.  
Given the ethos of Mumbai, there are always new kinds of on-going activism in the 
city. A very important form of collective action, which had begun in the urban centers, is the 
‘voluntary protest or civic action group’. Initially these groups functioned only as pressure 
groups, drawing attention to the deteriorating quality of urban life. They would appeal to the 
public and government. In the early years most groups preferred constitutional and peaceful 
modes of protest. 
Presently Mumbai has an impressive array of civil society organizations. They work in 
the areas of housing, health care, self-employment for women and gender justice, primary 
education, communal harmony and so on. Some have also been active in advocacy. A num-
ber of the NGOs have now a diversified role whereby they work towards varied issues relat-
ing to urban poverty. Many NGOs are based and have origins in the community. Some have 
been major actors in the policy agenda of governments, while a few others have been recipi-
ents of foreign funding. However, the increasingly important role played by NGOs in the de-
velopment arena is also related to the declining legitimacy of the state especially in the era of 
neo-liberalism, where it is not only the funding agencies but the state itself that accepts the 
presence of NGOs in the participatory role. It is now recognized that development requires 
not only the ‘hardware’ of investment in physical infrastructure, but also the ‘software’ of de-
                                                
18 Chandhoke 1985. 
19 Oldenburg 1993, p.142. 
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veloping human capabilities. Without capacity-building for managing institutions, legal-
rational procedures for decision-making and accounting, development will not be socially 
sustainable. Civil society organizations seem to be entrusted with the task of developing this 
‘software’ now.20  
A brief examination some of civil society organizations in Mumbai is made here. 
These organizations have been engaging in direct service provision and supporting local 
organizations in service delivery. State and local governments also have initiated such par-
ticipatory effort in an attempt to strengthen their own service implementing mechanisms, 
reach out effectively to recipients, and involve the public. Most of the NGOs in Mumbai are 
now focused on direct interaction with their constituencies, for example in providing services 
in the area of housing, education, and health care. There are others who support capacity-
building enabling communities to organize or procure such services for themselves and to 
access entitlements, like ration cards. Such urban engagement involves interacting with insti-
tutions of the state. It also involves advocacy, i.e., working to secure access to entitlements 
for marginalized sections of the city and effective implementation of existing policies and pro-
cedure.  
The following organizations have interacted with the local authorities on a continual 
basis. They have been acting as intermediaries between beneficiaries, community-based 
organizations, and government bodies. These NGOs have successfully maintained a rela-
tionship with the government because they seem genuinely committed to tackling the issues 
and believe in engaging the government constructively in the urban development agenda.  
Women’s self-organized savings and credit associations, such as Annapurna, or 
squatter communities, like the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (RSDF), are examples of 
community-based, capacity-building organizations that have contributed in releasing latent 
social capital. In every department of the local government the presence of NGOs is visible. 
Their contribution is acknowledged by the authorities as well. This researcher was informed 
by several authorities that the collaboration of NGOs is generally sought in all areas except in 
the ones that requires ‘technical’ or highly-specialized inputs. The areas in which there is 
collaboration include health care, women’s empowerment, sanitation, and education, or, in 
other words, ‘social’ infrastructure. In matters relating to ‘physical’ infrastructure, the role of 
NGOs is limited.  
 
Ration Kruti Samiti: Partnership for Influencing the Public Distribution System (PDS) 
This organization works to procure stocks of food, it issues food cards to citizens, and has 
created a network of fair price shops for card holders. The objectives of the PDS are twofold 
– to provide basic food supplies at a subsidized rate and control market prices. Though the 
PDS is a lifeline for the poor in Mumbai, the system is fraught with malaise. Since the mid 
1990s PDS has collaborated with a NGO called the Ration Kruti Samiti (RKS). RKS is a col-
lective of around forty NGOs-CBOs, rationing system consumers, employees from the De-
                                                
20 Baviskar 2001. 
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partment of Rationing, and shopkeepers. 
Through collaboration PDS and RKS aim to help people gain better access to regular 
and good quality grains, facilitate a process of dialogue between the government machinery, 
consumer groups, and shopkeepers, and, to minimize corruption in the system. It also strives 
to make the PDS more accountable and responsive.21    
 
Pratham: A Three-way Collaboration in Education 
Pratham has reached most of the municipal schools in Mumbai, and is working very closely 
with the school administration and education department of local and state government. It 
has been successful in mobilizing financial resources from the corporate sector, by co-opting 
representatives of donor agencies as permanent invitees in the mission.  
Pratham’s Mumbai Education Initiative is a model for three-fold collaboration involving 
the voluntary sector, corporate sector, and the Municipal Corporation. Corporate sector con-
tribution made it possible for Pratham to widen its coverage in the city. In the financial year 
1997-98, Pratham was able to mobilize Rs. one crore from the corporations such as ICICI, 
Tata Sons Limited, Mahindra, and Mahindra Limited.22 The local government was a willing 
partner the effort supported the government policy of ensuring free primary education for all 
children in Mumbai, especially from the lower strata.  
 
Annapurna: Partnership in Women’s Empowerment 
This working-class women’s grass-roots organization was formed in 1975 in the aftermath of 
the 1974 Mumbai textile strike. The women displayed tremendous will to tackle both their 
economic conditions and the harsh treatment by textile mill owners. This process enabled 
women to become micro-entrepreneurs and self-employed workers. It has helped them to 
discover their innate strength and work collectively to address common problems. 
Two of the schemes started by the government, Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (RMK - 
providing an alternate source of credit for poor women) and Indira Mahila Yojana (IMY - 
offering financial schemes to women) were inspired by NGOs like Annapurna Mahila Mandal 
(AMM).The story of AMM is one of constructive engagement in the mainstream of planned 
development process. It works to facilitate access rights of poor women. It is one of the few 
NGOs in Mumbai or even India that opted to work as an intermediary between the formal 
banking system and women micro-entrepreneurs in the informal banking sector. The organi-
zation has worked to enable and sensitize, bringing the women and the formal structures to 
co-operate closely.23    
                                                
21 Joshi, Leena: Consumer Protection: Ration Kruti Samiti, (available at: http//www.mumbai/RKS, accessed on 
March 11, 2004). 
22 Chavan 2000. 
23 Personal interviews with Prema Purao, founding member of the organization on December 26 and 28, 2002. 
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Praja: Citizens Charter and Capacity Building Program 
Efficient city administration is a function of several inter-linked factors, one of the most impor-
tant being the quality of intelligent citizenship. Good local self-government cannot function 
merely with a highly motivated bureaucracy and elected representatives. The other side of 
the coin is the concern, awareness, and interest manifested by the city’s inhabitants. An 
enlightened and well-informed citizen body can pressure local governing into action and 
compel it to respond to the needs of the people.  
To access information on basic civic amenities is another important right. However a 
lack of awareness about the structure and functioning of the municipality (that provides these 
amenities) coupled with an apathetic attitude of service providers towards poor communities 
hinders the poor from acquiring basic services. Besides, there are a number of procedural 
and administrative details which individual citizens are unaware of. With this as background, 
PRAJA came up with a capacity-building program for the Citizens’ Charter in Mumbai. 
PRAJA has been working with the Brihan Mumbai Corporation (BMC, i.e. city administration) 
to publish, disseminate, and implement this Charter for the city. The Charter is conceived as 
an instrument to bring about transparency and accountability in the administration of essen-
tial services.24      
 
STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP: CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
A wide variety of groups (apart from the four mentioned here) contribute to various aspects 
and issues in civil society in Mumbai. However, controversy about their ‘political’ role has 
emerged in recent years. Notwithstanding the neo-liberal notion that believes in completely 
de-politicizing this realm, there is still considerable faith in the contrary. In Mumbai most civil 
society groups are linked to the state. This is mainly because in any form or feature of devel-
opment, organizations must enter into a dialogue with the state if effective change is to take 
place. Even without actually capturing political power, many groups, through their sheer de-
termination and commitment, can and do influence political authorities with such interaction. 
(e.g., Pratham or Annapurna). Over time the distinction between state ‘versus’ civil society 
has come to be slowly replaced by state ‘with’ civil society.  
However, it would be naive to assume that this process is peaceful or free of conflict. 
Several important political questions arise. The first concerns the pluralization of the state in 
this power-sharing arrangement between government and NGOs. The second addresses the 
problem of democratic citizenship with citizens becoming passive consumers of an agenda 
constructed in their name. The third inquires into the role of NGOs functioning as 
intermediaries, developing an agenda that can appropriate people’s participation. The fourth 
asks about how NGOs have incorporated all those aspects of the government that they have 
resented viz. amassing scarce resources meant for communities or in building up significant 
bureaucracy along with all the support-staff. The fifth looks into the problem of NGOs mort-
                                                
24 Capacity Building on the Citizens’ Charter of Mumbai, Mumbai, August 2001. 
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gaging/subordinating their own development agenda to suit donor-requirements.25   This ten-
dency is particularly dangerous, as in the era of globalization, it is unwise to uncritically ac-
cept rules of engagement set forth by the prevailing global power structure.  
Inter-organizational conflicts have arisen as well. This occurs when there is no co-
ordination, mutual understanding, or willingness to work together. A senior bureaucrat, who 
did not wish to be quoted, claims that some organizations have been ruthless in their pursuit 
of project-grabbing. Egoists who claim to speak ‘on behalf’ of the beneficiaries usually head 
such organizations, though they have no sense of responsibility or accountability whatso-
ever. Activists from several organizations interviewed by this author blamed the ‘bureau-
cratic’ mentality of officers who are normally unwilling to partner, least it affect their own ex-
clusivity. Politicians, on the other hand, purportedly are more often than not jealous of their 
success and popularity among the community they serve. Politicians who spoke to this re-
searcher stated, diplomatically, that they welcome cooperation with NGOs provided the or-
ganizations are sincere and committed to their cause. Finally, the community and beneficiar-
ies of government/NGO activity complain that promises and policies have been made for too 
long. Community members say they would certainly co-operate (as they have in the slum 
rehabilitation or micro finance, among others) if the collaborators were clearly committed to 
fulfill their basic responsibilities towards them. They certainly seem to be in no mood to be 
either taken for granted or fall prey to tall promises. 
It could be interpreted that all those involved (government, organizations, and the 
community at large) have a stake in getting things done. Organizations that believe in sus-
tainable urban development (at least the more committed ones) wish to retain their autonomy 
and yet are willing to partner to bring about necessary change. The politicians are too happy 
to get work done as it enhances their credibility and their constituency wishes things got 
done! If they perceive change or even potential changes they seem more than willing to form 
their own community organizations to provide appropriate inputs to the NGOs to act as the 
intermediary between them and the government. Many community-based organizations like 
the railway slum dwellers federation, tenants associations, anganwadis/ballads (child-care 
groups), mahila mandals (women’s groups), credit associations, mohalla committees 
(neighborhood protection-security groups), etc. have been formed in Mumbai to cater to the 
needs of the respective communities. This has undoubtedly increased participation besides 
enhancing collective bargaining capacity vis-à-vis both the NGOs and the Government.  
Thus, the relationship between some CSOs and the state in Mumbai has taken the 
form of a ‘client-patron’ relationship which is both ‘confrontational’ and ‘cordial’. However, the 
specifics of the relationship depend largely upon (a) understanding between the partners, (b) 
renegotiable relationship between them, and (c) recognition of this necessity by local com-
                                                
25 For instance, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an extraordinary proliferation of foreign-funded NGOs in India. 
According to the Home Ministry, by the year 2000 nearly 20.000 organizations were registered under the Foreign 
Contribution Regulation Act, though only 13.800 of them submitted their accounts to the government as required. 
Total foreign funds received by these organizations rose from Rs 3.925 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs 4.535 crore 
(about $993 million) in 2000/2001.(Economic Times, 4 September 2003).  
 
Raiser / Volkmann (Hg.): Civil Society in Globalizing Cities of the South                                 21 
 
 
 
 
munities or stake-holders. It can be argued that with this kind of interaction ‘state-society 
synergy’ emerges, where active government and mobilized communities can enhance each 
other’s developmental effort. It has also been argued forcefully in this connection, that 
“…creative action by government organizations can foster social capital. Linking mobilized 
citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of government. The combination of 
strong public institutions and organized communities is a powerful tool for development.”26 
This alliance of social (horizontal) and institutional forces (vertical) shows the interde-
pendence and interaction between the state and civil society sectors. It indicates how civil 
society organizations seize initiatives, which put pressure for action by the government bod-
ies, which in turn seeks collaboration. It can thus be stated that civil society organizations 
and their developmental responsibility can be seen as part of a wider process that includes 
governments fulfilling their development responsibilities. “The state should play a positive 
role in the promotion of civil society, by providing institutional frameworks within which civil 
society can prosper and flourish.”27...  
 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CAPITAL  
Horizontal linkages and interactions in Mumbai have thus been challenging. They have also 
changed conventional development paradigms that had traditionally relied only upon the or-
ganizational and governmental framework for any kind of action. These new developments 
have significantly altered existing roles and relationships between development actors. Part-
nerships and alliances have been established, nurtured, and expanded. Such urban voices, 
needs, concerns and aspirations of micro grassroots communities, are being heard and 
heeded to and are becoming a part of the choices that are made by the government. 
A broader understanding of social capital accounts for both positive and negative as-
pects by including vertical as well as horizontal associations between people and including 
behavior patterns within and among organizations. Horizontal ties are needed to give com-
munities a sense of identity and common purpose. But these go with "bridging" ties that tran-
scend various social divides. Otherwise horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of 
narrow interests. 
In the long run such efforts build up human capital that is so vital for any democratic 
polity. The broadest and most encompassing views of social capital include the social and 
political environment that shapes social structure and enable norms to develop. The impor-
tance of forging ties within and across communities, recognizes that the capacity of various 
social groups to act in their interest depends crucially on the support (or lack thereof) that 
they receive from the state as well as the NGO sector. Similarly, the state depends on social 
stability and widespread popular support. In short, economic and social development thrives 
when representatives of the state and civil society create fora in and through which they can 
identify and pursue common goals. This outlines a model of an “associational democracy” 
                                                
26 Evans 1996, p.1119. 
27 Gopal 2001, p.43. 
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model that could be discerned from such interface, in which state and civil society organiza-
tions are both part of a single, new regulatory framework that transforms both.28 
 
CONCLUSION 
It seems quite clear from this study of Mumbai that most of the NGOs have no intention or 
even desire to supplant or compete with the state in their development efforts. Several of 
them continue to interact frequently with the government. This kind of interaction has led to 
the emergence of what is called ‘state-society synergy,’ where active government and mobi-
lized communities can enhance each other’s developmental effort. It has been argued that 
“synergy usually combines complementarity with embededness and is most easily fostered 
… even in the more adverse circumstances typical of Third World countries.”29 
In the city of Mumbai, there recently have been endeavors to open up political spaces 
by increasing the diversity of horizontal organizations. When these horizontal civil society 
organizations interact with the conventional vertical structures of the system, what can and 
does emerge is a synergy of action, an alliance, and a partnership that perhaps is of utmost 
importance in the present period of transition. No one or single organization is either capable 
or willing to take up the burden of development. This is more evident in the urban centers, 
which have a range of problems, the amelioration of which can be brought about only by an 
alliance of forces. In a mega-city like Mumbai, with mega-problems of varied kind, even the 
biggest of NGO with its local success and expertise cannot, however, be a replacement for 
the government or policy institutions. Thus a number of citizens’ organizations have emerged 
over the last decade in response to the failure of our dominant institutions. These are not 
traditional charities and community development organizations, but a new breed of citizen 
organizations coping with change through citizen action. They are forging a new vision of the 
human future. Governments have also started paying more attention to them and acknowl-
edging their contribution. More importantly, government has recognized the necessity and 
significance of partnership politics in urban initiatives. 
Sustainable urban development can be fostered only if and when all social, political, 
and institutional actors combine in a collaborate effort in bringing about the necessary 
changes that would benefit the people. Both the state and civil society move in to fulfill cer-
tain responsibilities that neither can individually accomplish. This has enabled a new kind of 
interaction that has led to the renegotiation of a set of rules between the two. These take the 
form of government institutions and non-government organizations collaborating in designing 
and providing for services, by mobilizing funds from among recipient groups and other 
sources and by monitoring delivery. In some cases this can create the basis for synergy, in 
which state institutions acquire greater legitimacy and improve their performance by develop-
ing responsive working relationships with civil society that draw on reservoirs of social capital 
built up in local communities.  
                                                
28 Hirst 1994. 
29 Evans, op. cit., p.1119. 
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NGOs' participation was thought to be particularly crucial as an intermediary between 
the poor communities and various other stakeholders especially in the area of slum rehabili-
tation, primary education, and also in the public distribution system. It was assumed that the 
NGO and CBOs they were supported by could be effective intermediaries because they were 
neither like government, which was interested in social control, nor like market agents, inter-
ested in profits. NGOs were to articulate to the government the needs and preferences of the 
poor communities in a professional way, and convey rules and regulations in simple lan-
guage and non-intimidating ways to the communities. Similarly, in dealing with market actors, 
NGOs were to assist the communities in mobilizing community resources to complement 
investment by private firms. 
The institutions of civil society are going to play an increasingly important role in the 
coming years. These changes that have been taking place in Mumbai, from the 1980s, have 
altered the meaning, definition, and role of development itself. There is a move, especially 
through such participatory endeavor, to make deliberative democracy a reality in a substan-
tial manner. Thus, the involvement of new kinds of alliances between formally and informally 
constituted citizens’ groups, NGOs, CBOs, and state institutions can perhaps be construed 
as an interesting development in that direction. Urban development in Mumbai therefore is 
not only about ways of delivering services efficiently and effectively, from top-down politico-
bureaucratic powers. It is instead about how people (especially the marginalized sections of 
the urban realm) with shared interests in relational webs, can come together to identify com-
mon concerns, develop strategic ideas, and generate the momentum to bring forward links 
and constructing discourses. As Manuel Castells, effectively argues "only by analyzing the 
relationship between people and urbanization will we be able to understand cities and citi-
zens at the same time. Such a relationship is more evident when people mobilize to change 
the city in order to change society.”30   
It is important to treat civil society not as a fixed entity incapable of revitalizing and re-
generating itself. Rather, it is a constantly changing social interaction with ever new possibili-
ties. Although one might be cautious about the discourse of civil society as it encompasses 
elements that are uncivil and as it encompasses a contradictory theme of the “repressive, 
reactionary and profane”, 21 Mumbai is at the crossroads of change. In this changing sce-
nario, several transformations are underway which may slowly but surely impact the interac-
tion between the different sections of the state and civil society.  
We live in a complex world where, amidst confusing proposals for all sorts of strug-
gles, there are also creative alternatives. During this period of uncertainties, but certainly not 
without hope, we do have certain mechanisms that would subject the markets, the state, the 
uncivil elements of civil society, and the negative fallout of globalization to the demands and 
aspirations of the people.  
 
                                                
30 Castells 1977, p.xvii. 
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2. Civil Society and Capacity Building in São Paulo  
By Pedro Roberto Jacobi 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brazil, and especially São Paulo, assessing the recent increase in social participation has 
been one of greatest challenges in the analysis of the reach of democracy in local govern-
ment-citizen relations. Although the visibility of social movements has declined since the 
1970s and 80s, in the 1990s popular participation was guaranteed and institutionalized in the 
context of representative democracy, so that public policy today actively takes into account 
such participation. This paper addresses the accumulated experience of São Paulo. This 
experience centers on different forms of self organization, community-based capacity build-
ing, and the acquisition of social capital. Civic engagement by different social sectors aiming 
to reduce social disparities and improve access to citizenship rights increases the prospects 
for social inclusion through different types of initiatives. Such programs center on: 1) equal 
opportunity and access to new technologies through community-oriented public spaces, such 
as telecentros, and 2) the development of citizenship, social entrepreneurship, and income 
generation.  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY- TRANSFORMATIONS AND TRENDS  
The transformation of the Brazilian public sphere is contemporary with the democratization 
that took place in many parts of the world, especially Latin America, from the 1980s onwards. 
The public arena in Brazil today must accommodate conflict, but it recognizes the negotiated 
order of modern democracy.31 Thematic social movements and non-governmental organiza-
tions are working towards the autonomous organization of society and a public sphere inde-
pendent of the State. This dynamic is engendered through self-constitution and self-
mobilization and has been institutionalized through laws as well as collective rights and cus-
toms. The mobilization of social actors has diversified the public sphere. The public sphere 
today is a place where identities are formed, solidarity established, and a network of associa-
tions institutionalizing problem-solving discourses arises.  
 In Brazil the transition from military rule to democracy (beginning in the 1970s and 
ending with the adoption of the 1988 Constitution) saw the emergence of a variety of social 
organizations, the transformation of professional bodies and trade unions, the rise of new 
political parties (the most visible example being the workers’ party, PT, which gained its first 
local mandate in Diadema, São Paulo, at the beginning of the 1980s), the creation of non-
governmental organizations originally opposing military rule, the re-emergence of a vigorous 
catholic church with its Comunidades Eclesiais de Base, and, at a later date, the birth of 
strong and fiercely independent movements such as the Movimento dos Sem Terra 
                                                
31 On civil society see e.g. Cohen /Arato 1992; Keane 1998; Hall 1995. 
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(movement of agricultural workers without land (MST))32. 
Avritzer33 has argued that the post-authoritarian, civil-society period in Brazil is asso-
ciated with three factors: modern and democratic social actors, the rise of the idea of free 
association in state-society relations, and the formation of new legal, political, and public 
structures capable of institutionalizing the socio-cultural concerns of civil society.  
In the context of this paper, civil society refers to a network of autonomous associa-
tions independent from the state and characterized more by solidarity and cooperation than 
by competition. The actors of civil society interact through networks and organize around 
common interests that may affect politics.34 
These actors have created new forms of interactions (i.e. the health, housing, and wa-
ter and sanitation movements) and redefined their relationship to the government. The 
knowledge and political culture that they have introduced help foster direct democracy in 
popular councils and other participatory initiatives. The emergence of a diversity of move-
ments, focusing on the concerns of women and ethnic and other minorities, has become a 
point of reference for multicultural demands within a universe of social exclusion. Different 
types of articulators - the progressive church, young professionals in the field of public 
health, medicine, social work, education and architecture serve as important advisers and 
provide a link between the institutionalized agendas of society and civil society groups.35  
Administrations with participatory experience tend to publicize their decision-making 
practices and encourage the democratic development of public spaces by overcoming infor-
mation asymmetries and affirming a new culture of rights.36 These innovative experiences37 
strengthen the capacity of low-income sectors to intervene in decision-making processes. 
Participatory budgeting has been a particularly successful experience and has reduced terri-
torial corporatism and stimulated a universal approach to urban affairs. More than 150 cities 
in Brazil used participatory budgeting in 2003. Porto Alegre has been using this device since 
1989. The Municipality of São Paulo experimented with participatory budgeting under the first 
PT administration (1989-1992), but subsequent municipal administrations did not continue 
this practice. In the interim, the successful experience of Porto Alegre38, now into its fourth 
consecutive administration, reinforced the legitimacy of the approach. The municipalities in 
the Metropolitan Region that adopted participatory budgeting as a mode of government have 
created a very stimulating experience to democratize public management at the local level.  
 
STRUCTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CITY OF SÃO PAULO 
In Brazil data on civil society associations is very hard to come by. A few surveys provide 
                                                
32 Scherer/Krischke 1987; Sader 1988; Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Jacobi 1992. 
33 Avritzer 1994. 
34 Avritzer 2002; Costa 2002; Jacobi 2000; Dagnino 2002. 
35 Jacobi 1992. 
36 Jacobi 2000; Dagnino 2002; Avritzer 2002. 
37 Jacobi 2003. 
38 Avritzer 2001; Avritzer 2003. 
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local head counts. Another source of information is data derived from the various census 
activities carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). In recent 
years voluntary activity has grown and is an important component of civil society. Available 
numbers derive from intelligent estimates, not precise census data. One estimate states that 
there are some 220,000 non-profits in Brazil, of which many are dedicated to philanthropic 
activity. Around 20 million Brazilians are involved in some kind of voluntary activity. This 
represents one fifth of the population between 15 and 60 years of age.39 Of the total of non-
profit organizations, a very small number, around 300, could be classified as social move-
ments that have been extremely active in popular education, supporting urban and rural 
movements, and creating independent forums for the discussion of major policy questions. 
The Brazilian Association of NGOs was created in 1991 and currently has 250 member or-
ganizations, all of which are registered as non-profits. They are committed to democracy and 
development and have at least two years of effective operation.  
In São Paulo the most common forms of interaction are community organizations, and 
some of them adhere to the traditional organizational logic of São Paulo social associations, 
known as Sociedades Amigos de Bairro (Associations of Friends of Neighborhoods, herein-
after: SABs). SABs emerged when São Paulo became home to a large contingent of mi-
grants attracted by the industrialization and development boom of the 1950s. SABs were an 
important intermediary in migrant relations with authorities.40 They usually represent a con-
stituency from a specific geographic area and are regarded by the authorities, the press, and 
even society in general as legitimate representatives. 
The SABs’ activism profile is extensive. They number around 550 in the city of São 
Paulo and about 1000 in the other 38 municipalities.41 Most SABs are located in low-income 
neighborhoods, and are euphemistically referred to as “Jardim” (garden). Today these SABs 
are hardly mobilized, despite their active past of the 70s and 80s. Today’s most active SABs 
are located in middle-class neighborhoods and work to defend these neighborhoods from the 
pressure by the real estate industry, changes in zoning, and violence. To overcome the isola-
tion of individual SABs, the middle class SABs created a forum called Defenda São Paulo in 
recent years. The Defenda holds meetings and discussions to map common problems and 
find solutions in an inter-district, co-operative practice. Unfortunately, however, most SABs in 
the city of São Paulo are located in low-income neighborhoods, and their role has signifi-
cantly diminished over the years, reduced to local demands and representation in Participa-
tory Budgeting. 
The fact that SABs have joined forces in larger organizations suggests that decentral-
ized management of the city and participation of civil society as a partner of the authorities 
has become an efficient way to pressure authorities and react against urban projects that 
prove disruptive in some neighborhoods.  
There are also a significant number of primarily cultural and philanthropic associa-
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tions. Official data published by EMPLASA indicates that around 120 organizations exist in 
the city of São Paulo and around 600 in the metropolitan region. This data comprehends a 
heterogeneous group of associations, including NGOs, unions, philanthropic forums, and 
community clubs.  
Another type of social organization is the Center for the Defense of Human Rights, 
working to protect human rights and fight violence, racial and minority discrimination, and 
other oppression. There are about 60 of these associations in the City of São Paulo and an-
other 160 in the Metropolitan Region. Most of these associations are a key resource for the 
poorest neighborhoods. 
The other organizations active in São Paulo belong to the Third Sector. They are 
mainly foundations linked to private and public corporations. They often form partnerships 
with other public organizations to influence public policy. Third Sector organizations are 
linked mainly to education, health, environment, and income generation.  
The number of partnerships between NGOs and private entrepreneurial foundations 
and enterprises is increasing. They strive to improve the quality of life, and several initiatives 
are associated with increases in access to complementary cultural activities in peripherical 
neighborhoods, basic information on human rights and citizenship, the creation of coopera-
tives to foster economic development, continuing education, and environmental education. 
Various self-organization groups have been included within the local politics, and this 
has reduced their political clout. Among the self organization groups, cooperatives have had 
more adherence. Examples are cooperatives centered on needlewoman supported by foun-
dations providing basic equipment such as sewing machines, cooperatives producing prod-
ucts with recycled paper, and others that gather unemployed workers doing all types of 
household services. These cooperatives have had vital support from an increasing number of 
“breeders of cooperatives” located in universities as the University of São Paulo, Catholic 
University, unions, and even private universities.  
The consequences of the different forms of civic engagement for urban governance 
are, on the one hand, pressure on local governments to include issues in their agenda and/or 
to refrain from polemical proposals. Recurring issues are urbanization and urban services, 
health care centers, day care centers, schools, cultural spaces, telecentros (digital inclusion), 
and initiatives to reduce levels of violence. The groups strive to reduce irregular business in 
residential areas, advocate against traffic corridors, and defend quality of life in residential 
areas.  
The principal outcome of the inclusion of new actors in the formulation and implemen-
tation of public policies is that public policies have ceased to be paternalistic. This has stimu-
lated the development of a sense of joint responsibility. São Paulo has implemented policies 
of social inclusion, where citizens are stimulated to participate actively in the development of 
policies. Some municipalities of the metropolitan region have succeeded in the development 
of programs to increase income generation, stimulate the creation of cooperatives and other 
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forms of economic initiatives, re-qualify workers expelled from the labor market, confront the 
issue of urban violence, and act in the prevention of drug use.  
As to social mobilization, there has been a significative decrease. The most active so-
cial mobilizers are “tenants’ associations” that invade empty buildings in the downtown area. 
Other social movements have had little visibility, though most have participated in important 
ways in different councils and participatory instruments, as part of the increasing involvement 
as “participatory publics”.42  
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND ROADS TO SOCIAL INCLUSION IN 
SÃO PAULO 
 
Socio-Territorial Exclusion and Increase of Social Capital in the Communities  
The most recent data on squatters in São Paulo City suggests that there were more than one 
million squatters in the city in 2000, more than 8% of the population. In some districts, mainly 
the most peripherical, the percentage of squatters may reach between 15% and 20%. The 
neighborhoods with the largest percentage of squatters also have high crime rates, mostly 
involving the population between 15 and 24 years of age.  
While there were 1554 squatter settlements in 1991, by 2002 that number had grown 
to 2018. Thus, in one decade, 464 new settlements arose in the city, covering 2% of the 
city’s territory. The number of squatters households increased from 196.000 in 1991 to 
287.000 in 2000. This data is disturbing. If 900.000 persons lived in squatter settlements 
(favelas) in 1990, this group grew by 30%, while the city grew only by 8%. Favelas have be-
come the face of poverty.  
Violence has increased dramatically in the socially most precarious areas of the city. 
The expansion of poverty and violence has its origins and reproduction in a superposition of 
lacks, thus adding for the augmentation of social vulnerability. Poverty and violence converge 
in the 96 districts of the city (Mapa da Exclusão Social; Indicadores de Vulnerabilidade Juve-
nil-Fundação SEADE). The higher the annual growth of poor headhouseholds of a district, 
the greater the chance of the region to live with an increase of violent deaths. Presently, one 
out of every five households lives below poverty line, and in those districts with the highest 
annual average growth of poor headhouseholds, there has been an increase in homicides, 
mostly related to drugs.43 In only four years - between 1996 and 2000 - the homicide rate 
grew by 15,3%. Homicide affects male juveniles most. Commentators speak of a “new pat-
tern of juvenile mortality”.44  
In Brazil the total number of homicides grew by 50% in the 1990s, which is much 
faster than the overall population growth. The number of juvenile victims increased by 77%. 
The national juvenile victimization rate increased in two decades from 30 (1980) to 52,1 
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(2000) per 100.00045, in Brazilian cities, 43% of juvenile deaths were due to homicide, while 
the national average was a mere 4,7%. In São Paulo, the mortality rate of that age group 
was 138,8. This is more than double the country’s average.  
One third of youngsters live in high crime areas. More than 400 thousand adolescents 
between the ages of 15 to19 are exposed to violence on a daily basis.46 Juvenile vulnerability 
data shows that one third of the youth in the city lives in regions with high risk of contagion by 
urban violence.  
Indicators on illiteracy show that less than 4,9% of the city population over 15 years of 
age is illiterate.47 Notwithstanding these positive indicators, children’s literacy in the impover-
ished peripheral regions is low. An equally serious problem is the rate of school eva-
sion/repetition and highly divergent student ages at each grade level. This situation has mo-
bilized various actors in the search of ways to confront the problem of social exclusion. This 
is especially true in neighborhoods also plagued by high crime rates.48  
The city of São Paulo has focused its economic programs on encouraging popular en-
trepreneurship, micro credit, manpower development and minimum income programs.49 In 
urban planning the city is addressing the urbanization of favelas and the quality of life in all 
neighborhoods. Social policy encompasses literacy programs, family health programs, and 
programs for street children with cultural and leisure components. The experiences in São 
Paulo and other municipalities in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo indicate the large 
range of possibilities for social inclusion through different strategies.  
One of the most challenging issues is to reduce and constrain the dissemination of 
violence that is destroying the bridges of social conviviality. The premise of these initiatives is 
to strengthen social links and the understanding of the importance of citizenship. Initiatives in 
low-income areas aim to include young people and train them to develop “social entrepre-
neurship”.50 The programs aim to create a local identity, social co-responsibility, and mobilize 
towards the solution of community problems. Also, they aim to engage an ever-growing 
segment of the community, reduce violence, and improve the quality of life.  
An interesting experience is the “community police”, implemented by the Military Po-
lice (institution administered by State of São Paulo) in the most affected neighborhoods and 
regions of the metropolis. Its focus is to improve relations between the police and community. 
According to official police data, this initiative has diminished crime rates, even in the worst of 
neighborhoods in the southern part of the city of São Paulo. The success is associated to a 
growth of trust and the creation of different forms of mobilization in forums against violence. 
These forums bring together different actors - churches, human rights organizations, com-
munity organizations, and the police - to discuss the best strategies to combat violence in 
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47 Fundação SEADE 2000. 
48 This is the case of Jardim Ângela and Capão Redondo in the extreme south of the city. Data from Mapa da 
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districts with the highest rates of violence (Capão Redondo, Jardim Ângela in the southern 
part, Vila Brasilandia in the northern part, Cidade Tiradentes in the east). These experiences 
strengthen social capital and cohesion. In the metropolitan region, 31 municipalities already 
have this type of program, and the outcomes are positive.  
 
OPEN DOORS THROUGH DIGITAL INCLUSION 
Another important initiative is the increase of digital inclusion programs to equalize opportuni-
ties to access new technologies. Several municipalities have entered partnerships with the 
Third Sector to integrate the digitally excluded.51 Several districts with high crime rates were 
chosen by the Third Sector specifically to establish such programs. The main challenge is to 
promote information technology as a means to social development, making it accessible to 
sectors of society with few opportunities of acquiring it otherwise. NGOs consider technologi-
cal inclusion part of a process to strengthen notions of citizenship and human rights and 
promote social empowerment. These experiences52 indicate the possibilities that are being 
opened, as a bridge of social and physical frontiers through digital contact, to confront tech-
nological segregation, emphasizing the multiplication of solidarities, alliances, and the grad-
ual formation of a digital community between the excluded and the different processes of re-
socialization and enlargement of citizenship.53  
In this context, the opening of ‘telecenters’ (telecentros) has generated a significant 
mobilization of human and material resources. In São Paulo, the municipal administration 
has already installed almost 60 telecentros and it hopes to have opened 107 by the end of 
2003. They are located in the poorest neighborhoods and are managed by the community, 
offering the population free access to internet and other online services. 
 
Access to Forms of Community-Based Capacity Building, Social Entrepreneurship 
and Income Generation in the Periphery 
Notwithstanding the dramatic social situation, there has been an important growth of organ-
ized groups, households associations, church groups, and social movements in the different 
peripheries of the region. Some of these organizations are cultural movements linked to hip-
hop, graffiti, and rap, and thereby attract youngsters frustrated by the harsh realities of life - 
unemployment, financial problems, domestic violence, drug trafficking and abuse, and alco-
holism. Many community organizations look for financial support to Third Sector and outside 
institutions.  
Community initiatives have created centers for the defense of human rights, partner-
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ships with schools in activities of environmental education (recycling, and cleaning of stream-
lets), community libraries, cultural fairs, and other activities that intend to change the condi-
tions of these excluded neighborhoods, training and qualifying potential social entrepreneurs. 
Several initiatives have become catalyzers and multipliers for proactive actors. The 
main task is to inspire young people to participate in problem solving in the peripheral re-
gions and motivate them to take charge of their own lives and their communities.  
The majority of programs aim to increase social inclusion. Some focus on the link be-
tween schooling and income, under the theory that longer schooling contributes to higher 
income. The challenge is to break the circle of poverty, the inability to earn a stable income, 
and homelessness. Some municipalities are very successful in coordinating governmental 
programs that address education, health, nutrition, and the fight against child labor. 
The lack in investments in the peripheries, in particular in libraries, playgrounds, rec-
reational spaces, and professional opportunities for young people undoubtedly has been one 
of the most serious problems municipal administrations face. They are trying to alleviate the 
problem through Unified Educational Centers (CEUs) in the peripheries, i.e. centers that offer 
educational and cultural community. In some situations, communities partner with social or-
ganizations and thereby gain access to cultural infrastructure, but this has been small and on 
a local scale. When this happens, the difference is felt.  
The municipality of São Paulo is seeking to consolidate a new generation of social 
and work-oriented policies.54 Its planning is based on three types of programs: a) redistribu-
tive programs, centered on three different groups – the unemployed between 16 and 20, 21 
and 39 and 40 and over; b) emancipatory programs – based on supporting different types of 
solidarity initiatives - micro credit, and occupational qualification in collective initiatives; and 
c) programs to back local development.  
Implementing programs consistently and systematically through technical and finan-
cial support to projects developed by locals is seen as an effective method to end the cycle 
of criminality and enhance social cohesion. The challenge is to strengthen a fragile social 
tissue. Recent published data indicates a reduction in the number of homicides and the rate 
school evasion in the most violent districts of the city, which one can interpret as a success 
of the programs.55 
 
CONCLUSION 
São Paulo is modernizing rapidly and adapting to economic changes and redefinitions. This 
modernization comes with a visible, and perverse, cost: increased unemployment, social 
exclusion, and urban violence. São Paulo increasingly is a dual metropolis, with an increas-
ing gap between the areas of so-called “global activity” and the periphery. Though marked by 
social inequality, São Paulo also is a region that has developed important innovations to 
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make democracy work. Nonetheless, the peripherical ring is growing in demographic terms. 
The growth of squatter settlements has modified the urban landscape. The periphery is the 
locus of poverty, social exclusion, segregation, and disarray.  
Civil society initiatives reflect the determination of citizens scattered throughout the 
region to fight for citizens’ rights and participatory democracy. The rupture with clientelistic 
and centralizing policies that dominated the Municipality of São Paulo from 1992-2000 gives 
increasing legitimacy to more administrative practices in public management. The inclusion 
of new actors through participatory budgeting and other initiatives involving civil society ac-
tors in the formation, implementation, and control of social policies has opened the way to 
exciting possibilities of change. There are clear indications the definition of the public sphere 
is slowly but steadily changing. Here new policies can be articulated. Institutional networks 
are bringing together diverse actors and leading to the development of agreements over new 
strategies linking a variety of interests and resources. Such experiences offer alternative per-
spectives on state and society that seek to guarantee the sustainability of public policies and 
the effective engagement of civil society in the definition of priorities and monitoring of activi-
ties. 
The number of people engaged in volunteer actions is much higher than many previ-
ously imagined. Municipal and civil society organizations have been linked in new ways, es-
pecially in those municipalities that consciously stimulate partnerships between the private 
sector, local government, and the community.  
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OVERVIEW ON NGOS AND THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS IN SÃO PAULO: 
 
Ashoka empreendedores sociais, www.ashoka.org.br 
Instituto Ethos de Responsabilidade Social, www.ethos.org.br 
Câmara Americana de Comércio, www.amcham.com.br 
Comitê para a Democratização da Informática, www.cdi.org.br 
Fórum Nacional Lixo e Cidadania, www.unicef.org/brasil/lixoecidadania 
Fórum Metropolitano de Segurança Pública, www.forumsp.org.br 
Instituto Sou da Paz, www.soudapaz.org 
Projeto Aprendiz, www.aprendiz.org.br 
Action-Aid, www.actionaid.org.br  
CENPEC, www.cenpec.org.br  
Instituto Ayrton Senna,www.senna. globo.com/institutoayrtonsenna ,  
Sampa Org., www.sampa.org.br  
ILANUD, www.sites.uol.com.br/ilanud.org  
NEV, www.nev.prp.usp.br  
Instituto Fernand Braudel, www.braudel.org.br  
Instituto Polis, www.polis.org.br 
FGV-Gestão Pública e Cidadania, www.gv.br/ford  
Fundação ABRINQ, www.abrinq.org.br 
Associação Comunitária Monte Azul, www.monteazul.org.br  
Casa do Zezinho, www.casadozezinho.org.br  
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3. Shanghai: Civil Society as Community Basis  
Some basic information on community development in Shanghai 
By Fan Lizhu 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic liberalization is accompanied by changes in the behavior of people in both their 
public and daily life. In China market competition is replacing the collective economy gradu-
ally. During this phase of development Western and Chinese traditional culture are becoming 
intertwined as urbanites seek to establish their own, new way of life in modern society. A 
relatively independent civil society has grown in China and increasingly is exerting influence 
on Chinese politics, economy, and culture. Objectively, this phenomenon requires Chinese 
leaders to face reality, i.e. to change their negative attitude toward civil society: its legitimacy 
and growing role in social, political, and economic activities. Indeed, Chinese leadership 
should take measures to encourage the sound development of civil society. 
Before economic reform and the opening up of society, a highly unified political sys-
tem integrated organization and leadership, state and society, and public and private inter-
ests in an almost single whole. There was no possibility to talk about civil society issues. Af-
ter economic reform, people have gradually abandoned traditional concepts of political ideol-
ogy and values. They have replaced them with new political ideology. In this small article, we 
are going to provide some basic information about Chinese community structure in urban 
areas with some examples from Shanghai. 
 
THE BASIC IDEAS OF COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION 
Since the mid-1980s community construction in China started with community services, and 
gradually expanded to community culture, community health care, community environment 
protection, and community security. The model of community construction bases of citizen 
involvement under government guidance. Through reform, China gave up its large central-
ized system for a new structure. The goal of community construction is to build up that struc-
ture: “small government, big society”.  
Since 1996 there has been an extraordinary upsurge in community development in 
large Chinese cities. Shanghai Municipal Government unveiled its reform plan “two levels of 
government and three levels of management” at the Working Conference on the City Proper 
of Shanghai in March 1996. In 1998, the community construction plan was extended to cover 
“two levels of government, three levels of management, and four levels of network,” serving 
as a prelude to reform in urban management. 
The two levels of government refer to the governments of the municipal and district 
levels with independent financial and law-enforcement powers. The three levels of manage-
ment are designed to increase the financial and personnel powers of sub-district offices. 
They will strengthen their ability to carry out comprehensive law enforcement and urban 
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management, bringing departments such as police substations, sub-administrations for in-
dustry and commerce, and taxation offices under their management. The goal of this ar-
rangement is to enhance sub-district offices of the government body closest to citizens and 
endow them with financial resources and power. The four levels of network emphasize the 
significance of local communities with one or more residents’ committees and ensure that 
significance by way of “the four levels of network”.  
Community development in Shanghai is providing some positive examples for other 
cities in China. Sub-district offices and residents’ committees have been de-linked from eco-
nomic organizations. The city’s community-service network has been specializing, industrial-
izing, and socializing through the introduction of technologies such as touch screens and 
communications hot lines. Community management is also becoming more open, democ-
ratic, and self-governing and is being incorporated in the process of reshaping communities. 
In the 1990s, Shanghai created the project “Community Culture Development”. In ur-
ban development, residents’ committees actively organized residents and addressed prob-
lems that the government could not solve. Combed with community education and commu-
nity culture, the project contributes to the “Spiritual Civilization Construction with Chinese 
Characteristics” in the community. The Socialist modernization is an undertaking featuring 
mutual aid and harmonious development of material and spiritual civilization.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY 
With the delegation of the social functions of working units (danwei) to sub-district offices, the 
sub-district offices are placing increasing hope on residents’ committees. In order to adapt to 
the change of their own functions and overcome deficiencies in the vertical contact of the 
original organizational system, sub-district offices have tried to establish a network of special 
committees and special service companies under these committees. 
 Sub-district offices formerly were structured into functional sections and departments. 
In order to adapt to present needs and put an end to the separation between regions and 
departments, sub-district offices gradually established four special committees through a 
process of trial and error. These committees are: the Civil Management Committee, the So-
cial Development Committee, the Committee for Improving All Facets of Public Security, and 
the Finance and Economic Committee. The organizational composition and responsibilities 
of these committees are as follows. 
 The Civil Administration and Public Health Sections under the sub-district office are in 
charge of the day–to–day work of the committees. The main responsibility of the committees 
is to manage, organize, coordinate, and supervise, to the extent that they are empowered to 
do so by higher authorities.  A committee provides direct leadership over legal-service offices 
and takes the initiative to cultivate relations with the public security squadron of the district 
sub-bureau of public security and the district office for improving all facets of public security. 
The main responsibility of a committee is to execute services in the areas under the jurisdic-
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tion of the sub-district office, such as social security, social welfare, community service, 
community culture, community education, employment, family planning, and grain-ration 
management. 
 The Finance and Economic Committee is an administrative management organ under 
the direct leadership of the sub-district office. Its main responsibility is to manage institutions 
and self-employed industrialists and businessmen under the jurisdiction of the sub-district 
office according to law the enterprises and ensure orderly economic development in the re-
gion. 
 Many sub-district offices in Shanghai have carried out institutional reforms separating 
administration from service provision. The Employment Service Center is in charge of unem-
ployment registration, job-searching assistance, employee guidance, the issuing of unem-
ployment certificates, administrative management of temporary workers, transfer of workers, 
and unemployment insurance. The Market Management Service Center is in charge of the 
application, transformation, and rebuilding of markets as well as the multi-dimensional man-
agement of markets. The Sanitation Service Center takes charge of the environmental sani-
tation in the community and consists of a sanitation on-duty team, team for eliminating pests, 
team for dredging pipes, and sanitation cleaning team. The Community Service Center 
mainly provides guidance for service activities in communities, helps set up bicycle sheds, 
milk retail stations, informational hot lines, homes for the elderly, care centers for the dis-
abled, gymnasiums, matrimonial agencies, and labor service management for these ser-
vices. The Cultural Service Center is responsible for managing billiard rooms, ballrooms, 
gymnasiums, and libraries. The Migrant Population Center takes care of registration certifi-
cates, and helps coordinates the migrant population. The Legal Service Center provides ser-
vices in criminal and civil cases, helps people prepare complaints, provides legal consulting, 
propagates the law, and assists in the mediation of civil disputes. 
In addition to the above-mentioned changes, the Shanghai Municipal Government, in 
order to increase the management ability of sub-district offices (the third level of govern-
ment), put under the management of sub-district office the original district environmental 
sanitation centers and housing management centers. 
 
CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS IN COMMUNITY 
Newly-established cultural mass organizations have encouraged some citizens to become 
involved at the community level. Examples are volunteers associations, house-owners asso-
ciations, citizen mutual-help organizations, and cultural groups such as stamp-collector 
groups, photographic associations, singing groups, and the sunset-fashion team. Through 
self-management and self-improvement, these non-governmental organizations have be-
come a major force in community cultural activities. 
 The rise of these new organizations suggests that civil society is emerging in China. 
How such organizations will be incorporated in governance strategies has been a critical 
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issue since the 1990s. Clearly, the leaders of sub-district offices need to adopt new man-
agement strategies in light of the increase of citizen organizations. Some grassroots organi-
zations have also sprung up at community level, yet these still lack the legitimacy as well as 
the financial resources to develop further. Community organizations supported by the gov-
ernment fare much better.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Are the changes at community-level in China evidences of the development of civil 
society in China? 
During the process of readjustment, the government is always in a key position to determine 
cooperative and alliance relationships and to perform the functions of guidance, coordination, 
organization, and service. In China the Communist Party represents the development trends 
of China's advanced social productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, 
and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.  
Most civil organizations are overly-dependent on the Party and government organs of 
political power. They have an official nature. The government has not become “smaller and 
smaller”, but stronger and stronger. The development of the current civil organizations in 
China is rather uneven. There are great differences in social, political, and economic influ-
ence and status among the various civil organizations. 
Chinese government is trying to promote a civil society with Chinese characteristics. 
As the economic and political environment has undergone changes, a relatively independent 
civil society has grown in China and today exerts an increasingly important influence on Chi-
nese politics, economy, and culture.  
 
Case Study: Meiyuan Community – A Chinese Community 
Between Traditional Chinese and Western Values56 
Economic liberalization is accompanied by changes in the behavior of people in both their 
public and daily life. In China market competition is replacing the collective economy gradu-
ally. During this phase of development Western and Chinese traditional culture are becoming 
intertwined as urbanites seek to establish their own, new way of life in modern society.  
Ever since China began to pursue modernization, Western influences on society have 
grown tremendously. Chinese officials are keen to follow Western modernization patterns. 
Chinese traditional culture, however, makes people firmly conform to public values. So is 
there any conflict between Chinese and Western culture? Yes, of course. Community leader-
ship is trying to develop new forms of community organization to take into account new val-
ues. Official community leadership addresses community culture through its administrative 
                                                
56 The case study was prepared in collaboration with Zhang Huanhua from Shanghai University. 
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organization. It thus is able to engage deeply in people’s daily life, in spheres such as family, 
education, medical care, and spiritual development. From our very primary observation of 
communities in Shanghai, it is very clear to see that community leadership is working actively 
to establish an applied ethics based on Chinese traditional norms and Western thoughts.  
In the following, we will focus on these areas: (1) community leadership, (2) commu-
nity health, education, and arts/music, and (3) the culture of families and communities. 
Aside from official leadership, we will look into unofficial community leadership as well. 
For instance, some entertainment groups have organized voluntarily, such as the Qi gong, or 
dancing groups. These groups have nothing to do with official organizations, but are very 
popular among ordinary residents. Civil society develops from the community base. So it is 
very significant to draw the picture of community culture in Shanghai, the most international 
city in China.  
This study was carried out in Meiyuan community. Meiyuan community is located in 
the new Pudong area, by the Huangpu River at the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone. It is 
highly developed and has a population of 150,000 (40,000 households) in an area encom-
passing 5.5 square kilometers. Among its residents, about 14.5% are retired, 66.3% hold full-
time jobs, and 19.2% are students. 42% of households are nuclear families, 23% live with 
three generations, 4.9% are single parent families, and 5.4% are disadvantaged families.  
The leadership of Meiyuan Subdistrict has the same characteristic of Shanghai’s gov-
ernment. However, the leaders of Meiyuan are trying to break away from the old system and 
the big burden of taking care of everything in the community. Now, “small government, big 
society” is a reform goal. It requires more active and efficient involvement of residents in the 
cultural construction. Our research will address how to develop neighborhood associations at 
community level and how government leaders will define the functional role of neighborhood 
associations in community. Yet what is community culture? This is a significant question for 
our study, especially because the concept of community in Shanghai differs from the idea of 
community in the West. Community in Shanghai is not defined by ethnic or other cultural 
elements, but is determined by administrative decision. This survey aims to present some 
basic aspects of community life, attitudes, and values in Meiyuan. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In July, 2002, the community of Meiyuan had a population of 150,000, divided into 28 resi-
dential areas. This survey covered all 28 areas. We obtained the samples by systematic ran-
dom sampling. We deleted all those who are below age 16 from the name lists. So our sam-
pling frame is made up of all the residents aged 16 or above in the community of Meiyuan. 
We distributed 1000 questionnaires. 973 returned, 884 of which were valid after verification. 
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THE FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY 
 
Part A: Residents’ Appraisal of their Life. 
1. The degree of satisfaction with community life is moderate. 
In this part, our first question is that how important the residents think the community is. 
Chart 1 shows us that the group who thinks the community is neither important nor unimpor-
tant to them is the largest group of respondents. Generally speaking, very few respondents 
tend to regard the community as unimportant or very unimportant. 
Chart 1: How important is community life to you? 
very unimportant
unimportant
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very important
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We then asked nine specific questions on development opportunities, the cultural environ-
ment, public security, public health, employment consultation, assistance offered to seniors 
and the disabled, assistance offered to the poor and underprivileged, the distribution of hos-
pitals and clinics, and medical fees. In brief, the frequency of “moderate” is also the highest 
for most of the nine questions.  
 
2. Family life satisfies residents most and material life dissatisfies them most. 
We asked two questions here. First: What satisfies you most in your private life? Almost 58% 
of respondents cited family life. The fewest respondents thought their material wealth was 
satisfactory.  
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Chart 2: In your private life, what satisfies you most? 
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Second: What dissatisfies you most? Chart 3 shows us that housing conditions ranked first, 
and income second. This result supports the previous finding.  
 
Chart 3: In your private life, what dissatisfies you most? 
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Part B: Attitudes and Viewpoints 
1. Parents’ two biggest expectations of their children are ”full education” and “moral 
maturity”. The golden rule is to teach a child is “self-disciplined as an example”. 
Table 1 shows that parents expect their children to obtain full education, moral maturity, and 
gain a specialized skill. According to this result, we may say that today’s parents in China are 
still very traditional in their expectations of children. Chinese parents have almost the same 
expectations of their children today as they had hundreds of years ago. 
Table 1:Parents’ expectations of their children 
 
69.8 4.2 3.5 19.5 10.8 4.8 7.1 3.5
14.3 14.4 5.2 32.1 26.0 6.2 11.2 1.1
8.4 11.6 7.8 15.7 31.7 14.3 20.0 .5
4.7 11.6 7.3 12.0 15.6 19.3 20.9 1.1
1.6 15.0 9.7 10.2 9.8 20.8 20.6 .8
.9 29.4 17.1 6.2 4.3 15.9 9.9 4.8
.2 10.4 33.7 3.6 1.4 16.9 8.6 11.0
.0 3.4 15.9 .7 .3 1.8 1.5 77.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 a 100.0 100.0 100.0
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
% 
fully 
educated 
% 
wealthy 
%
powerful
%
morally
matured
%
have a
specialized
skill
%
contributing 
to the 
society 
% 
sociable 
%
other
The numbers in the left column represent the level of importance, ranging from 
1 = “important" to 8 = “unimportant".
a.  
 
On the other hand, only few respondents expected their children to be powerful or 
wealthy. I personally think this is a strange, maybe even doubtful, phenomenon in a society 
which values power and money so much. In addition, more than half of the respondents don’t 
tend to expect their children to contribute to the society. This is opposed to the ideology of 
collectivism that the Party imposes. I think it is a strange but, anyway, understandable, phe-
nomenon. 
About the means that parents use to cultivate their children, the most important is 
“self-disciplined as an example”, and the second-most important is “traditional ethics”. These 
two methods have long prevailed in China’s history. In this respect today’s Chinese people 
are still very traditional. 
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Table 2: How should children be raised by parents? 
 
20.2 26.7 56.7 14.0 2.5 4.0 
17.5 37.0 23.0 17.8 4.9 2.0 
31.4 15.7 12.1 30.3 6.2 2.0 
24.7 16.2 5.0 30.3 7.1 2.5 
5.5 2.8 2.9 6.9 54.8 13.6 
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a.  
 
 
2. To age at home and in the family is acceptable. 
As for the question “where do you want to spend the end of your life?”, both children and 
parents indicated that the home and family was the most acceptable place to spend the end 
of one’s life. 
Chart 4: Where do you want to spend the end of your life? 
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3. Most people work to earn a living. Education is vital to success. 
Chart 5 tells us that more than 55% of respondents work to earn a living, and more than one 
fourth of respondents work for self-fulfillment. 
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Chart 5: Why do you work? 
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When we introduced another variable, education, we saw that for those who have a 
high-school or college education, self-fulfillment and earning a livelihood were equally impor-
tant. For those who have a university education, the latter obviously outweighed the former. 
And for those who had only a middle-school education, they worked because everybody 
works or only to earn a living. So we could conclude that the higher the degree of education 
one receives, the more rational (either purpose-rational or value-rational) people’s under-
standing of their work, and the more they can afford to make self-fulfillment a priority. 
As for success, most respondents thought that enough education, a stable society, 
and hard work were the three most important factors. Family background was seen as least 
important. This is quite a modern attitude. 
Table 3: Most important factors for success 
 
221 25.6% 142 18.0% 111 14.6% 
100 11.6% 155 19.7% 152 19.9% 
243 28.2% 125 15.9% 116 15.2% 
53 6.1% 59 7.5% 83 10.9% 
208 24.1% 223 28.3% 169 22.2% 
33 3.8% 80 10.2% a 126 16.5% 
5 .6% 3 .4% 5 .7% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Answers %
First important factor
Answers %
Second important factor
Answers % 
Third important factor 
1 = “enough education”
2 = “fair play” 
3 = “a stable society” 
4 = “a wealthy, influential or prestigious family”
5 = “hard work” 
6 = “a wide social network”
7 = “other” 
 Possible answers: 
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4. Most people believe in honesty and credibility. 
It is often held that only the elderly believe honesty and credibility is important. Our findings 
suggest that this is wrong, since people at almost every age level value this principle. Educa-
tion does exert some influence, but not excessively. Respondents with a college education or 
above definitely thought that this principle was “very important”, and those who only have 
elementary education or below thought it was “important”. However, those with a middle-
school or high-school education had an ambivalent attitude. But until now we cannot tell why. 
This point requires further study. 
 
5. Most people have the sense of justice, but it is not strong enough to compete with 
affection for their own children.  
 
Chart 6 shows that the value of justice ranks high in today’s China. I personally doubt that. 
Are there really so many people who will sacrifice for justice? The finding does not corre-
spond to most news and stories we usually hear. 
As for the question of whether people expect their own children to sacrifice for justice, 
most of the answers vary proportionately to the answers to the previous question, but not 
entirely. Only in those who have the strongest sense of justice, the value of justice outweighs 
parents’ love for children.  
 
Chart 6:What do you think of those who sacrifice for justice? 
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Raiser / Volkmann (Hg.): Civil Society in Globalizing Cities of the South                                 47 
 
 
 
 
Chart 7: Do you expect the same attitude from your children? 
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6. Ancestor worship still counts in some way, but it is not an important matter to inte-
grate the whole family. 
When we asked “Is it important to offer sacrifices to ancestors on Qingming festival?”, almost 
three quarters of respondents affirmed. This may suggest that the idea of ancestor worship is 
still valued by most Chinese people. From this we can infer that the value of filial piety still 
counts in some way.  
Most respondents will spend some holidays with their family, few will never do so. 
This indicates that the family still has some influence on today’s Chinese people. But those 
who are between 20 and 50 tend to have a more dependent choice than those below 20 or 
beyond 50. I guess it is because the former are more engaged in social activities than the 
latter. And this may suggest that family concerns are no longer as predominant as they once 
were.  
The further analysis shows that people who have a middle-level education (including 
middle-school, high-school and college education) tend to spend more holidays with their 
family than do others. We cannot tell why until now. This point again requires further study. 
 
7. The Party (CPC)’s propaganda is thought to be the biggest influence on public 
morals. 
What influences public morals? According to Table 4, the Party’s propaganda is the most 
important factor, and Confucian ethics comes in second. Interestingly, they represent the so-
called “new tradition” and the “old tradition” respectively. 
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Table 4: What influences public morals? 
 
638 81.0 129 21.3 24 4.4 49 9.0 21 4.1 
67 8.5 295 48.7 143 26.1 86 15.8 16 3.1 
33 4.2 98 16.2 200 36.5 173 31.7 35 6.8 
23 2.9 54 8.9 115 21.0 201 36.9 a 77 14.9 
27 3.4 30 5.0 66 12.0 36 6.6 368 71.2 
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The numbers in the left column represent the level of importance 
Ranging from 1 = “most important” to 5 = “most unimportant”. 
 
 
Part C: Interpersonal Relations 
1. Interpersonal relationships in neighborhoods are weakening. 
Chart 8 tells us that the relationship between neighbors can seldom be as good as a family, 
nor as bad as that between strangers. Yet nearly half of our respondents said that they will 
offer help if needed. Another third said that they chat with neighbors only occasionally. This 
result may suggest that the interpersonal relations in neighborhood are weakening. 
Chart 8: How are you getting along with your neighbors? 
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Then we asked: What kind of neighbors do you find are easy to live with? In general, 
the data shows that neighbors with a similar life style or similar hobbies are easiest to live 
with. 
Chart 9: What kind of neighbors do you find are easy to live with? 
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Further analysis tell us that people who have a college education or above like to live 
with neighbors with a similar education level. People who have a high-school education like 
to live with neighbors with similar hobbies. People who have a middle-school education like 
to live with neighbors who have similar living habits. 
 
2. Colleagues and schoolmates are major sources of friends. 
Where do people make friends? Chart 10 shows that the main source of friends is col-
leagues, and the second source is schoolmates. Together they make up nearly 70%. 
When we introduced the variable of age, it became clearly that most friends of those 
below 20 are from school, for those between 20 and 35 from social activities, and for those 
between 36 and 65 from among colleagues. 
When we introduced another variable, education, we saw that friends of those with a 
university education mainly come from social activities and among schoolmates. For those 
with a college education friends are recruited from among schoolmates. For those who have 
a high school education friends are found among colleagues.  
 
 
Raiser / Volkmann (Hg.): Civil Society in Globalizing Cities of the South                                 50 
 
 
 
 
Chart 10: Where do you make friends? 
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3. Residents interact well with the sub-district government, but rarely ask for help. 
Generally speaking, residents and sub-district governments have positive interactions. 69% 
of respondents were “concerned with public affairs”. 90% were willing to “substantially assist 
in the affairs of the community”. 75% were willing to “put forward their suggestions to the 
community”. 84% thought that the sub-district government tends to accept their suggestions.  
However, only one third of respondents would “ask the government for help” when 
confronted with difficulty. We don’t know whether this is because the number of residents 
who don’t need help is small, or because most residents are not willing to ask governments 
for help.  
From the below chart, we see that there are two different trends. Those whose 
monthly income is below 8000 are more likely to ask for government assistance the lower 
their income. But for those whose monthly income is beyond 8000, this tendency reverses. I 
guess the first tendency can be explained by economic incapability. As for the reverse ten-
dency, it may be explained by their lack of time to do house work. Of course, these two hy-
potheses need to be tested by further research. 
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Chart 11: How does economical status influence whether people ask commu-
nity government for assistance? 
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CONCLUSION 
In general, life in Meiyuan community is geared to residents’ different needs. Based on plaza 
culture, community culture, terrain culture, and special culture, Meiyuan community carries 
out many cultural activities, such as literary performance, Summer evening parties, knowl-
edge contests, citizen moral education, etc. to satisfy the needs of resident of different back-
grounds and life situations. At the same time, cultural activities emphasize the size and pub-
lic participation, and try to achieve community activity everywhere and everyday. Residents 
feel that community activity plays a very important role in improving the quality of life and 
creating good community atmosphere. Cultural activities are mostly managed by govern-
ment. The people involved are mostly very active residents. Powerful leaders work efficiently 
with the support of strong economic and administrative power. Do they still need unofficial 
community leaders to cooperate and provide services which cannot be provided by govern-
ment? How should one utilize the cultural resources in a community such as swimming 
pools, sport grounds, computer labs, etc? We posed this question to difference interviewees, 
community leaders, school principals, and residents and got different answers. Among those 
answers, however, we found a unifying desire to create community identity. The main prob-
lem is who will be the organizer and integrate a diverse population. 
A powerful sense of mission arises from a community vision emanating from the 
community itself. Such vision is not mandated or controlled by any outside party. Rather, it 
comes out of the collective, deeply-imbedded experiences and wisdom of community mem-
bers and draws on both the traditional and current assets of the society and community. 
It seems that there is a deadlock in dealing with the relationship between official and 
unofficial leadership. 
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4. Johannesburg’s Resurgent Civil Society: For--or 
Against--Globalization and World-City Status? 
By Patrick Bond57 
INTRODUCTION 
As a site to consider ‘civil society’s’ recent development, Johannesburg is notable in many 
respects, not least because it has, since the mid-1980s, spawned amongst the most vigorous 
urban social movements anywhere in the world. This paper discusses the way that the 
specifically ‘urban’ and ‘global’ come together through Johannesburg-based civil society 
challenges to municipal, national and even global-scale political processes. The central 
hypothesis is that globalization has intensified strife between a newly-elected democratic 
government and organizations representing the urban poor and workers. It may well be that 
such strife would have emerged in a post-liberation period in which international economic 
relations were not so predominant, but nevertheless conflicts became intense in recent years 
between the objectives of obeying global trade, investment and financial impulses on the one 
hand, and serving people’s needs on the other.  
 South African civil society has long been deemed a highly contested terrain, not 
amenable to the traditional liberal definitions, such as: ‘the non-market sphere of organizational 
life lying between the family and state.’ From the early 1990s, attempts to add traditional radical 
analysis to the liberal ideal via a reading of Gramsci led to the idea, expressed by Alexandra 
township leader Mzwanele Mayekiso, of ‘working-class civil society.’58 There have been many 
more attempts to understand South African civil society through existing literatures of social 
movements, civil society and the ‘third sector,’ as noted below. Invariably, politics and ideology 
overwhelm typical institutional and functional considerations. I take it as axiomatic in a highly-
politicized society such as South Africa that ‘civil society’ will inevitably be a terrain of struggle, 
and that extreme class differentiation (along with residual racial imbalances and gender 
discrimination) has resulted in a more militant mood amongst the majority of citizens. Such a 
mood is less easily channeled through the sorts of ‘community-based organizations’ (mainly 
aiming at self-help strategies) or Non-Governmental Organizations providing welfaristic 
services, that are more common in less politicized settings. 
 One reason for South Africa’s exceptionalism in this regard, is that since even before 
coming to power in 1994, the country’s ruling party--the African National Congress (ANC)--has 
been accused of using civil society for its own ends, and of either demobilizing grassroots 
organizations or demonizing them as ‘ultra leftists’ or ‘popcorn civics’ (that pop up suddenly and 
immediately fall back).59 However, the most crucial basis for the politicization of civil society in 
Johannesburg was the late 1990s decision by city managers to welcome corporate globalization 
and all that it entails, after several difficult years in which central government in Pretoria had 
subjected the economy to trade and financial liberalization. Civil society critics allege that 
because more privileges were given to investors and wealthy residents as a function of the 
                                                
57 Research assistance by Thulani Guliwe is gratefully acknowledged.  
58 Gramsci 1971; Mayekiso 1996. 
59 Heller 2003. 
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desire to be a world-class city, the material grievances of low-income people were not only 
mainly ignored, but their organizations were actively demobilized and then repressed. 
 After an international and local literature review (Section 2), the story must be told dating 
from the upsurge of urban social movement mobilization in the mid-1980s. The crucial political-
ideological condition was the rebirth of anti-apartheid campaigning sparked by trade union 
mobilization in early 1970s Durban, and by the famous 1976 Soweto student uprising. This 
background explains why, after late 1980s state repression, the early 1990s ‘civic associations’ 
played such a fundamental role in the way Johannesburg emerged as a democratic city 
(Section 3). 
 Notwithstanding a period of mid-1990s decay of civic movement strength, the 
resurgence of Johannesburg residents’ organizations in the late 1990s is correlated to the way 
globalization impinged upon city finances and policies, especially in relation to the distribution 
and regulation of housing, water and electricity. The city’s ‘Igoli 2002’ strategy caused massive 
conflict with trade unions and a new generation of community groups that came to be federated 
in the Anti-Privatization Forum. The single most spectacular event that reflected the 
contemporary tensions between Johannesburg’s world-city aspirations and local civil society 
activists was the August 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Because of split 
loyalties between important civil society groups, including nationally-headquartered trade unions 
and Non Governmental Organizations in Johannesburg, the story is complex, but nevertheless 
crucial to evaluating how Johannesburg might fare when seeking not only future events of such 
global stature, but also the status of world city (Section 4). So too is the ruling party’s increasing 
concern that its civil society critics are a) excessively internationalized and b) unfairly hostile to 
South Africa’s stance on globalization, to the point of representing an ultra left’ politics (Section 
5). 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
The (Global) Rise of Urban Protest  
This paper builds upon major studies of civil society conducted over the past decade or so, 
beginning during the early period of democratic transition when the lessons of East Bloc 
‘socialist’ repression of civil society were most important for South Africa’s own social change 
trajectory.60 The last quarter-century’s democratization wave, from Southern Europe to the 
Cone of Latin America to East Asia to Africa to Eastern Europe, witnessed an international 
revival of concern for civil society’s prospects, particularly in cities where both human rights 
advocacy and social activism were integral to broader political and economic liberalization. 
 The key objects of this analysis, urban social movements, are, as Schuurman puts it, 
‘social organizations with a territorially-based identity, striving for emancipation via collective 
action.’61 But it is important to distinguish immediately between urban ‘organizations’--
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particularly those that emerge in the implementation of formal social policies (such as welfare 
agencies or implementation-oriented NGOs) or in the reproduction of daily life (mutual aid 
groupings)--and movements, which are both protest-oriented and utopian, in the sense of 
attempting to construct the community of a future society in the decay of the old.62  
 As globalization amplified local uneven development during this period, rising inter-urban 
competition between many of the world’s mega-cities reduced municipal management to the 
enhancement of competitive advantage, via the heightened efficiency of the city as an export 
platform. The bottom line was the productivity of urban capital, as it flowed through urban land 
markets (now enhanced by titles and registration), housing finance systems (featuring mainly 
private sector delivery and a dramatic reduction in state subsidies), the much-celebrated (but 
often extremely exploitative) informal economy, and (often newly-privatized) urban services 
such as transport, sewage, water, electricity and even primary health care services (via 
intensified cost-recovery). Such processes were vigorously contested by popular movements, 
agitating both around conjunctural social policy decisions associated with structural adjustment, 
especially cutbacks in subsidies for food, transport or other services. As a result of looking to 
more structural determinants of the problems instead of just short-term causes of crisis, the 
movements began to transcend the traditional dichotomy of urban organizations: between an 
inward-looking territorial identity, and the rhetoric of a broader emancipation.63  
The leading scholars of the Third World’s periodic ‘IMF Riots’, Walton and Seddon, have 
contemplated the transition from the chaos intrinsic in most urban uprisings to the more durable 
mobilizations required for movement-scale democratic transformation. Given that the most 
decisive factor in the reproduction of everyday life in many Third World urban settings is the 
shrinkage of the state under conditions of structural adjustment, ‘the broader trend is toward the 
decline of clientism and, conversely, the growing autonomy of urban low-income groups.’64 As 
states lost their patronage capacity to channel social surpluses to supporters thanks to 
structural adjustment, social movements began to cast off the worst influences of corporatism 
and corruption associated with urban civil society under populist regimes. Similar structural 
factors are prevalent in South Africa.65 
 
South African Civics, Then and Now 
There are numerous reviews of Johannesburg civic resistance during apartheid’s dying days of 
the early 1990s.66 Many subsequent publications on Johannesburg civil society dealt explicitly 
with the mid-1990s governance debates.67 However, the more detailed studies reflected upon 
the systemic demobilization of68--and in one case, the desire to demobilize69--the community 
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groups that had played such an important early 1990s role. As a relatively less politicized 
environment prevailed after apartheid was defeated, one quantitative survey specified civil 
society with such a large lens as to lose the distinction between status quo and social-change 
organizations.70 While other reviews of civil society’s influence after apartheid ended were more 
respectful, they retained enormous skepticism that the intense counterhegemonic role played 
earlier in the decade could (or indeed even should) be restored under conditions of state 
legitimacy and democracy.71  
 However, by the late 1990s, the state’s increasingly neoliberal policies had severely 
deleterious effects on urban South Africa, and resistance was not long in materializing (as 
documented below). Researchers identified an upturn--if not a full-fledged revival--of some 
Johannesburg-area SA National Civic Organization branches, for example.72 However, because 
of a simultaneous political break from the ANC, the most substantial community groups that 
formed the Anti-Privatization Forum mainly rejected the organizational forms of the prior 
decade, even if their leaders had gone through the earlier round of urban struggles. 
 The composition of Johannesburg’s working class was, likewise, changing. As new 
social subjectivities emerged, they merited study in and of themselves, often as sites of 
‘autonomist’ politics.73 According to a proponent of this analysis, the new movements are based 
on ‘community self-management, construction of grassroots discourse, direct action in ways 
that are so rich, plural and diversified to be totally at odds with the hierarchical organizational 
practices of the traditional Left.’74 Such an alleged rupture with left traditions, however, is hotly 
contested, with local leaders insisting that the Johannesburg left has simply reconstituted itself 
via community activism, while the traditional goals of socialism via state power remain intact.75 
 Finally, in terms of thinking globally and acting globally, more recent studies describe the 
resurgence of Johannesburg-based civil society’s global vision, in part through the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in September 2002,76 and in the construction of 
the African Social Forum and World Social Forum.77 By the early 2000s, indeed, the key 
characteristic of Johannesburg’s most active civil society movements was profound skepticism 
about both the world-class city agenda adopted by the municipality and the national 
government’s neoliberal response to economic globalization. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY STRUGGLES FOR A NON-RACIAL CITY, EARLY 1990S 
To give these studies historical context, and to establish the need for a tighter relationship 
between contemporary urban movements and Johannesburg’s drive to become a world city, 
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requires further review of civil and political society dating at least to the high points of activism in 
the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Background to the Civic Resurgence 
Civil society organizing in South African cities has a long tradition, but the historical memory of 
activists to the intense apartheid urban repression during the 1960s-70s might be the most 
important precursor of contemporary civil society. An essential element of political ideology 
across South Africa, but particularly in Johannesburg’s vast proletarian townships, was the ANC 
call for ‘ungovernability,’ made from exile in early 1985. There quickly emerged a vision of 
building ‘organs of people’s power’ in the townships.78 
 The stage of ungovernability was a new political epoch. ‘Make South Africa 
Ungovernable!’ was a popular slogan, accurately reflecting the mood and the activities already 
underway in the townships. The ANC’s surrogate was the United Democratic Front (UDF), a 
broad multi-class, non-racial coalition that coordinated the national protest campaigns against 
apartheid. The mid-1980s revolts against urban apartheid were repressed by repeated States of 
Emergency. But financial sanctions and other economic constraints forced white business to 
negotiate with the ANC in exile, and in turn brought Pretoria to its senses. On 2 February 1990, 
the apartheid government began its political liberalization, culminating in the transfer of power to 
a democratic government in May 1994 following the first one-person, one-vote election in South 
African history. But of greatest importance for understanding Johannesburg civil society during 
the 1990s through the present, is the rise and fall and then subsequent rise of township ‘civic 
associations’—or simply ‘civics’--and popular movements.  
 The civics’ choices of strategies and tactics rested upon several crucial universal norms, 
values and practices: non-racialism, mass participatory democracy, a commitment to fight 
apartheid (including its fake reforms) until one-person one-vote in a unitary state was obtained, 
and the translation of struggles over material grievances into a broader program of socio-
economic justice. There were at least three immediate hurdles to clear beginning in the early 
1990s: the threat--in many cases, reality--of barbaric state-terrorist activities, especially 
associated with the Zulu migrant workers’ organization Inkatha; the increasing misery created 
by intransigent local white councils and other official bodies; and uncertain relations with the 
recently unbanned ANC. We can consider each in turn. 
 By 1990, approximately eighty civics were active in the region stretching from the coal 
mines of the Vaal Triangle, to Johannesburg and the Rand, up to Pretoria. While political 
liberalization in 1990 allowed the civics to operate above ground again, it was a more classically 
repressive process--a semi-fascistic paramilitary attack on civics--that brought the groups into 
alignment in the struggle for democracy. For example, horrific hostel-based attacks occurred 
against township residents in mid-1990 in which a thousand people were killed. Fed by police 
and an alleged ‘Third Force,’ the unprecedented aggression of Inkatha migrant workers forced 
street mobilization on a scale not seen since the 1985-87 States of Emergency. Inkatha’s well-
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documented massacres, initiated in Seboking in late July 1990, pushed communities to 
reevaluate what kind of local civil society they were defending. 
 In more than a few cases, the traditional community fabric, characterized by organized, 
highly politicized response, tore badly. Facing desperate conditions, ANC-aligned township 
youth resorted to in-kind violence, sometimes with tribal overtones. The material conditions 
behind the violence--particularly the inhumane housing of migrant laborers--were to some 
degree addressed by the more visionary civics, such as in Alexandra. Civics made migrant 
hostel conversions (into family units) a top priority, and the National Union of Metalworkers and 
National Union of Mineworkers unions established longer-term proposals to provide migrants 
with access to family housing or at least to better living conditions. 
 The community fabric came under even more stress when negotiations with local white 
town councils began in late 1990. More than 150 such negotiations were attempted across the 
country at that point, but they produced very uneven results which mitigated against short-term 
conflict resolution. Johannesburg’s ‘Metro Chamber’ was an exception, but not without internal 
contradictions associated with ANC control that led to its premature mid-1990s demise. White 
officials wanted the civics to call off widespread rent boycotts, which in Soweto were joined by 
80% of formal rent-paying households for four years.79 Civics wanted a range of immediate and 
medium-range concessions, ranging from highly-subsidized services, to a single metropolitan 
tax base, to the development of formulas for democratic local government, to transfer of rented 
houses from the state to the people. All these objectives were achieved for South Africa’s 
largest township, Soweto, in theory, in September 1990. The signing of the Greater Soweto 
Accord between the Soweto People’s Delegation, the Transvaal Provincial Administration and 
three black councils could have been the model for civic victories elsewhere in Johannesburg 
and across South Africa, but two problems emerged.  
 One was the desire of many civics to use negotiations as a final tool for discrediting the 
black councils (which were viewed, quite appropriately, as local agents for apartheid), and so 
the inclusion of the three Soweto mayors raised activist hackles. Although civics were rarely 
formally implicated in dozens of fatal attacks against black councilors since the mid-1980s, their 
message to the councils was always simple: ‘resign.’ It was evident to the civics that only with 
the removal of the racially-demarcated, financially-unviable system of local government, to be 
replaced by ‘one-city, one-municipality’ governance, would this form of violence cease. 
 The other barrier to applying the Soweto Accord elsewhere was the surprising 
intransigence of most white local councils, including Johannesburg. Many white authorities were 
stung by then-president FW De Klerk’s efforts to open municipal amenities such as libraries and 
swimming pools to all races, and they were also cognizant of the deteriorating position of the 
ANC in national negotiations, until the April 1993 breakthrough that followed the assassination 
of popular leader Chris Hani. In combination, such factors signaled to white councils that they 
had the capacity to resist democratization. Add to this the confusing strategies of provincial and 
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parastatal authorities--which sent contradictory signals to negotiators--and it quickly became 
apparent to leading civics like the Alexandra Civic Organization and Johannesburg’s Actstop 
that joint regional actions would have to replace case-by-case negotiating. Hence was born the 
Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal (CAST), a group determined to unite a variety of 
urban organizations and to approach the authorities with a standard set of demands. 
Nevertheless, the impunity with which police and Inkatha carried out their oppression suggested 
a concurrence at the highest levels of the state. This realization, in turn, led many civic activists 
to question their own relations with the ANC, which was regularly accused of laying down its 
arms and making excessive concessions in negotiations.  
 
Civics and the ANC  
In Johannesburg and elsewhere, the ANC appeared to be sidelined during most, if not all, of the 
local negotiations, aside from local government coordinator Thozamile Botha’s efforts to 
maintain consistency with the ANC’s national constitutional goals. Local ANC branches were 
still relatively weak, and the organization’s membership was less than 200,000 in 1990. The 
prospect of a standard African nationalist power transfer made the willingness of key township 
activists to remain in autonomous civics (instead of converting them to ANC chapters) all the 
more remarkable. From 1990, even though they were allied in spirit and history to the ANC, civic 
leaders began a delinking process from formal political parties, and permitted (even 
encouraged) membership from sympathizers of other parties, such as the PanAfricanist 
Congress and Azanian People’s Organization. In 1992, the key activists in each region founded 
the SA National Civic Organization (SANCO) as their umbrella body. 
 The political maturity in civil society required to transcend internecine party politics came 
in large part from the material basis of the movement, especially the bottling up of the black 
intelligentsia in townships. These ‘organic intellectuals’ might, under a different system, have 
moved into the high-paying white collar jobs in finance, administration and services that began 
proliferating in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, they were forced by apartheid to live and organize 
in townships, and this accounted in part for the enormous moral strength of urban resistance 
and the clearly-stated (and fought for) ideologies. Those ideologies--whether based upon the 
ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter or the mid-1970s traditions of ‘black consciousness’ and 
socialism--by-and-large remained ‘anti-capitalist,’ in spite of the generosity the ANC bestowed 
on big business as a potential anti-apartheid ally from early in 1990. 
 In the urban sphere, business began to earn the status as an ally of deracialization. The 
most important voice of business was the Johannesburg-based Urban Foundation, which from 
1991 attempted to win civics to their position. As its leading strategist, Jeff McCarthy, argued, 
winning civics over to a ‘market-oriented’ urban policy would ‘hasten the prospect of alliances on 
broader political questions of “vision”.’80 The option of joining this political-economic project was 
perhaps the most important choice that civics faced in the short- and medium-term. Until 1994, 
the civics were resolutely anti-capitalist, but after demobilization began in earnest in the wake of 
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the country’s May 1994 liberation, SANCO turned to a corporatist relationship with the ruling 
party.  
 No matter the strength and creativity of the civic movement at its peak, a period of 
demobilization resulted from the ascendance of the ANC to state power in 1994. Civil society 
was meant to be nurtured, according to official documents such as the 1994 Reconstruction and 
Development Programme: ‘Social Movements and Community-Based Organizations are a 
major asset in the effort to democratise and develop our society. Attention must be given to 
enhancing the capacity of such formations to adapt to partically changed roles. Attention must 
also be given to extending social-movement and CBO structures into areas and sectors where 
they are weak or non-existent.’81 This did not happen, as an enormous funding boost meant for 
civics and other CBOs was diverted into advertising the state’s new ‘Operation Masakhane’ 
(pay your bills) campaign.82 Perhaps the most charitable interpretation of the relationship 
desired by the ANC can be found from an important discussion paper circulated widely within 
the party. Author Joel Netshitenzhe insisted that, due to ‘counter-action by those opposed to 
change,’ civil society should serve the ruling party’s agenda: ‘Mass involvement is therefore 
both a spear of rapid advance and a shield against resistance. Such involvement should be 
planned to serve the strategic purpose, proceeding from the premise that revolutionaries 
deployed in various areas of activity at least try to pull in the same direction. When “pressure 
from below” is exerted, it should aim at complementing the work of those who are exerting 
“pressure” against the old order “from above.”’83 In reality, as we will see, most of the pressure 
from below in South Africa’s largest city soon came to be directed explicitly against the ruling 
party.  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY STRUGGLES FOR A ‘DECOMMODIFIED’ CITY, EARLY 2000S 
 
The Return of Protest 
By the late 1990s, Johannesburg was witnessing regular community rejections of obedience 
and discipline. South Africa’s own version of the IMF Riot began breaking out in townships such 
as Soweto, Tembisa, Eldorado Park and KwaThema.84 In July-September 1997, as the SA 
government insisted on using harsh tactics to enforce a cost-recovery approach to infrastructure 
and services, township protests intensified. Grassroots demands included lower service 
charges, an end to pre-paid (and more expensive) electricity meters, and cut-offs of basic 
services. The protests turned violent in some areas, and included clashes with the police and 
municipal councilors. 
 By mid-1998, the conflicts had reached even deeper into East Rand townships and 
smaller rural towns. In the townships of Witbank and Tsakane, east of Johannesburg, municipal 
offices and a post office were burned after evictions and summonses stripped residents of their 
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personal property. In Amersfoort, community residents kidnapped a leading councilor in anger 
over mass cut-offs of water which led directly to the death of an infant. Tembisa saw more strife 
over evictions from houses where commercial banks declared foreclosure. On the East Rand, 
ANC councilors’ houses were even burned down in rage, and in one tragic incident, a mayor 
was killed allegedly for disconnecting residents’ services. An unsuccessful 1998 protest by 
Soweto and Alexandra residents against the Lesotho Highlands Water Project included an 
attack on its designer, the World Bank. In 1999, as Johannesburg’s Igoli 2002 
commercialization strategy was adopted, the SA Municipal Workers Union was engaged in 
sustained public confrontations (including a protest by 20,000 workers). In 2000, the Soweto 
Electricity Crisis Committee was formed to reconnect electricity to those disconnected, and the 
Anti-Privatization Forum gathered urban residents and students opposed to the University of 
Witwatersrand’s outsourcing.85 When Alexandra township experienced forced removals in 
February 2001 once the national cholera epidemic spread there, the country’s leading elite (and 
generally pro-government) paper, the Sunday Independent--protested ‘bureaucratic know-it-
allism and disregard for individuals and indeed communities. Sadly the events in Alex have all 
the elements of the worst of apartheid-style thinking and action.’86 
 
Johannesburg’s Electricity and Water Wars 
From 2001, the electricity sector was the subject of particularly intense civil society contestation 
once Eskom began disconnecting the supplies of 20,000 Sowetans each month. In November, 
the front page of the Washington Post carried a lengthy analysis that portrayed activists 
reconnecting electricity as ‘Robin Hood’ figures who fought ‘all of this globalization garbage our 
new black government has forced upon us,’ as one Soweto grandmother put it.87 A month later, 
minister of public enterprises Jeff Radebe criticized the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
(SECC) for the ‘Operation Khanyisa!’--Reconnect the Power!--campaign.88 Radebe, SANCO, 
the Human Rights Commission, Eskom, the Johannesburg Metro and Johannesburg’s 
corporatised City Power agency launched ‘Operation Lungise’--Light Up--to persuade Sowetans 
that, as full-page advertisements put it, ‘All you need to do is pay your current account. Every 
month. On time. And with those payments, we’re able to keep improving service delivery’. 
Although quite a few Sowetans signed up for Radebe’s deal, within a few months payments 
levels were back to pre-deal levels.89 Finally in early 2003, Radebe announced that R1.4 billion 
worth of Sowetans’ electricity arrears would be canceled, yet still the payment rates remained 
low. 
 Much the same story occurred in subsequent months in the field of water, as the New 
York Times reported on its front page in May 2003, based on a site visit to a civic group headed 
by Bricks Mokolo in Orange Farm township (even further southwest than Soweto): ‘Officials at 
Johannesburg Water acknowledged that in communities like these, billing people for water has 
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been like squeezing water from a stone... Mr. Mokolo, a veteran of the anti-apartheid 
movement, urges people not to pay. His motto, he said, is “destroy the meters and enjoy the 
water.”’90 In part because the activists chose national and even international targets (e.g., the 
World Bank and Paris-based Suez, Johannesburg’s water supplier), these sorts of social 
struggles occasionally linked global, national and local movements, as well as Johannesburg to 
rural areas. 
 For example, the SA Municipal Workers Union, Rural Development Services Network, 
Johannesburg Anti-Privatization Forum and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee simultaneously 
demanded a specific minimal daily amount of water (50 liters) to be supplied to each person 
free. According to activists, the free services should be financed not only by subsidies from 
central government, but also by a ‘rising block tariff’ in which the water and electricity bills for 
high-volume consumers and corporations rise at a more rapid rate when their usage soars to 
hedonistic levels (a position opposed by the World Bank, which viewed such cross-subsidies as 
inefficient). 
 Similar strategies for decommodification91 were emerging from Johannesburg-based 
NGOs, unions, churches and social movements in other sectors. The need for free access to 
antiretroviral medicines, for five million HIV+ South Africans, was increasingly acute. A 
campaign for a Basic Income Grant was taken up by churches and trade unions. The Landless 
People’s Movement objected to the failure of a commodified land reform policy designed by the 
World Bank, and insisted upon access to land as a human right. These campaigns were mainly 
directed from Johannesburg. The ANC government’s argument against such expansive national 
and municipal policies, however, was that international competitiveness and job creation relied 
upon South Africa’s and Johannesburg’s successful integration into the world economy. If 
‘globalization made me do it!’ was the favored justification for neoliberal policies, then civil 
society would have to use Johannesburg as a base for contesting corporate-dominated 
globalization. An unprecedented chance to do so emerged in August 2002, when Johannesburg 
hosted the United Nations-sponsored WSSD. 
 
Civil Society Marches on Sandton 
On 31 August 2002, at least 20,000 supporters of the ‘Social Movements Indaba’ and the 
landless (as estimated by BBC’s correspondent) marched along a 12 km route to the site of the 
WSSD. The route took the demonstrators to the country’s richest suburb, Sandton, from one of 
the poorest, Alexandra Township. In contrast, what was termed ‘the Global Civil Society Forum’-
-supported by the Congress of SA Trade Unions, the SA Communist Party, the South African 
Council of Churches and the ANC itself--attracted only roughly 5,000 to the Alexandra soccer 
stadium at the same time to hear president Thabo Mbeki, in spite of the fact that the ANC 
advertised the possible participation of Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat (neither of whom arrived 
at the WSSD). At stake in this contest were both prestige in South African politics and the ability 
of government officials to disguise deep dissent from world leaders. The SA NGO Coalition had 
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pulled out of the Forum march the day before, claiming the ANC was manipulating the 
gathering. 
 The Social Movements Indaba core group had claimed the week before, ‘We will take 
Sandton!’--but the prior question was, who would win the hearts and minds of Alexandra? This 
question was striking on the eve of the big march, when Mbeki’s weekly column in the e-zine 
ANC Today included the following analysis: ‘So great is the divide that even as many are 
battling in the WSSD negotiations for a meaningful outcome that will benefit the billions of poor 
people in our country, Africa and the rest of the world, there are others, who claim to represent 
the same masses, who say they have taken it upon themselves to act in a manner that will 
ensure the collapse of the Summit. These do not want any discussion and negotiations. For this 
reason, they have decided to oppose and defeat the UN, all the governments of the world, the 
inter-governmental organizations, the major organizations of civil society participating in the 
Summit and the world of business…’92 
 Hundreds of activists had been jailed in Johannesburg for non-violent protest in 
preceding weeks: the Anti-Privatization Forum’s ‘Kensington 87’ shot at and arrested outside 
the mayor’s house; 100 from a landless group in the Mpumalanga town of Ermelo; 77 from the 
Landless People’s Movement demonstrating outside the Gauteng premier’s office; and nearly 
100 from the Soldiers’ Forum (an Anti-Privatization Forum affiliate of ex-ANC armed forces 
treated badly in the post-apartheid army). Tellingly, all were later released without being 
convicted of any crime. On August 24, an academic conference at Wits University suffered a 
police stun grenade attack when 800 candle-bearing marchers began to move off the university 
grounds to the local jail. And on August 31, after the last-minute unbanning of the anti-WSSD 
march, police and army overkill was still evident. ‘One would have thought that South Africa had 
gone to war during the Summit,’ commented Human Rights Foundation director Yasmin Sooka. 
‘Many senior police officers from the apartheid force were recalled and put in charge of security 
operations... It was almost unbelievable to watch the heavily armed police and soldiers lining 
every inch of the route with guns pointed at the marchers.’93 Would this incident set the tone for 
future relations between state and civil society in South Africa’s highly-politicized aspirant world 
city? 
 
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL VERSUS CIVIL SOCIETY 
The struggle for Johannesburg’s future is revealing for local, national, continental and even 
global politics.94 The dominant ‘political society’ has viewed Johannesburg’s urban movements 
as a profound threat, not only during early 1990s apartheid but also early 2000s neoliberalism. 
Illustrating the contemporary importance attributed to its critics by the ANC, civil society--
especially based in Johannesburg townships and radical NGOs--is alleged to be a) ‘ultra-left’ 
and b) excessively globalized.  
                                                                                                                                                   
91 The phrase comes from Esping-Andersen 1990. 
92 http://www.anc.org.za, 30 August 2002. 
93 Sooka 2003, p.58. 
94 Kingsnorth 2003 and Klein 2002. 
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 Mbeki’s statement to an ANC policy conference showed how deeply he was shaken by 
the militancy of protests against his government and the WSSD a month earlier: ‘Our movement 
and its policies are also under sustained attack from domestic and foreign left sectarian factions 
that claim to be the best representatives of the workers and the poor of our country. They 
accuse our movement of having abandoned the working people, saying that we have adopted 
and are implementing neoliberal policies… They assert that, on the contrary, we are acting as 
agents of the domestic and international capitalist class and such multilateral organizations as 
the World Bank and the IMF, against the interests of the working people.’95 On that point, John 
Appolis, a leading Gauteng trade unionist, associated with the Anti-Privatization Forum, 
observed, ‘By consistently highlighting the central role of the ANC government in driving the 
neoliberal agenda many international movements were won over to the side of the social 
Movements Indaba.’96 
 In sum, it is apparent that the past few years have brought together at least four factors 
that will continue to affect local state-civil society relations: Johannesburg’s increasingly 
unsatisfactory municipal services for poor people (due in part to globalization pressures); the 
failure of neoliberal macroeconomic policies to deliver jobs and rising incomes; national and 
municipal political dynamics that fail to incorporate—and instead exclude—the urban masses; 
and an internationalist ideology on the part of the new protest movements. Will these conditions 
lead to the kinds of dramatic breakthroughs that were last witnessed a decade earlier, when 
urban social movements were instrumental in dislodging municipal-scale and indeed national-
scale apartheid? Today, in both resistance and the potentially liberatory demands for 
decommodification and ‘deglobalization,’ Johannesburg’s new social movements hope to 
dislodge their national and local government’s commitment to neoliberalism and increasingly 
repressive governance, which they view as ‘class apartheid,’ or in other words, continuity from 
1990 to the present, as well as change.  
 
                                                
95 Mbeki, T. (2002), ‘Statement of the President of the African National Congress, Thabo Mbeki, at the ANC Policy 
Conference,’ Kempton Park, 27 September. 
96 Appolis 2002.. 
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